IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 05-2012-CF-035337-AXXX-XX

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

BRANDON BRADLEY,

ORIGINAL

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF DIGITALLY RECORDED MOTIONS HEARING

The transcript of the Digitally Recorded Motions Hearing held in the above-styled cause at the Moore Justice Center, 2825 Judge Fran Jamieson Way, Viera, Florida, on the 16th day of January, 2014, commencing at 3:32 p.m., before the Honorable Morgan Reinman.

> RYAN REPORTING REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS

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Case # 05-2012-CF-035337-AXXX-XX

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## APPEARANCES

JAMES McMASTER, ESQUIRE
and
TOM BROWN, ESQUIRE
Assistant State Attorneys
2725 Judge Fran Jamieson Way
Building D
Viera, FL 32940

Appearing for the Plaintiff

RANDALL MOORE, ESQUIRE
MICHAEL PIRROLO, ESQUIRE
MARK LANNING, ESQUIRE
Assistant Public Defenders
2725 Judge Fran Jamieson Way
Building E
Viera, FL 32940

Appearing for the Defendant

Brandon Bradley, Defendant, present

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Okay. I do have an Order from the State's Motion for Continuance that was heard from January the 13th, 2014. I call it a status conference. I have a couple of copies. I'm going to go ahead and deliver those at this time.

If we could give that to my staff attorney. Mr. Moore, this is for the Public Defender. I gave you many copies so everyone at your table could have a copy.

This is for the State.

And just for the record, the Order was handdelivered to the State and the Defense in open court.

Okay. That goes through -- just basically says that the motion per the State's continuance was granted. It does confirm that the trial schedule -- that the case will -- the non-jury trial will commence on February 24th.

I gave you an extra date there for non-death penalty motions on February the 20th at 3:00 p.m. Talks about the motions scheduled for today, talks about the motions scheduled for the 21st. And it also says the days in March that there will be no court.

With all due respect, I thought this trial was going in February. I have some dates that I'm going to be off in March. I could change those, but money has RYAN REPORTING

been spent with regard to time off, and if it's not an inconvenience, I'd still like to take those days off.

If something happens based on the trial and things that happen in the trial, I may change my mind with regard to that, but I'm hopeful that that won't -- I'll be able to take those days off because I do have some time off that's scheduled and money's been spent with regard to arrangements, thinking that the trial was going to be in

the month in February and not March.

Okay. Having said that, Mr. Moore, I will let you go first with regard to your motions. And you just need to tell me which motion we're going to hear and let me get to it, and then we can proceed.

MR. MOORE: Sure. I would like for the State
Attorneys to approach the Bench to discuss a logistical
matter first, please.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll go bench conference.

(Whereupon, there was a Bench conference as follows:)

MR. MOORE: Yes, ma'am. I've discussed with the courtroom deputy the issue of security, and an agreement that we're proposing to the Court is related to the wearing of the stun belt.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MOORE: And as the Court can see, they've got

numerous deputies present in court, and the agreement 1 was that if Mr. Bradley wears a stun belt, we don't 2 object to that. Then they will have three uniform 3 4 deputies, dressed as this gentleman is, in the courtroom, there will be two others in plain clothes out 5 in the gallery, and then two other deputies in street 6 clothes out in the gallery. And nobody will be seated 7 conspicuously close to Mr. Bradley, so that the casual 8 observer can look and see that they are security people.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MOORE: So, there will be three deputies in the green uniforms in the courtroom, and a total of four out in the audience; two of whom will be also dressed in green, and two will be dressed in plain clothes. And they will not be seated too close to Mr. Bradley.

So that in exchange, then, we won't object to him wearing the stun belt.

THE COURT: Okay. I think they call it the rack belt. Stun belt a/k/a rack belt.

MR. MOORE: Okay.

THE COURT: That has been discussed with me and I have no objections to that. I note in one of your motions has to do with uniform deputies coming to observe, so we'll address that separately.

MR. MOORE: That will be a different issue.

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1 THE COURT: That will be a different issue. 2 we'll address that, as well. 3 Okay. No, I have no objection to that. Okay. 4 MR. MOORE: Thank you. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. (Whereupon, the Bench conference was concluded, 6 7 after which the following proceedings were had:) MR. MOORE: Your Honor, I filed a list of the 8 9 motions that I propose to cover today, in the order that 10 I propose to cover them. 11 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MOORE: Unless the Court would rather take any 12 13 of them out of order, I intend to stick with this order of presentation, and I will go straight through until 14 I'm done, unless the Court has questions or... 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. We can go until 5:30 today. Whatever we don't get done at 5:30, we can take up on 17 the 21st, and we'll take it from there. 18 Let me make sure. I didn't check this list to see 19 if my Order was the -- I have the motions. Just let me 20 make sure and see if my Orders are the same. 21 22 Okay. So far, it looks like we're the same, so that will make it easier for me, too, as well. 23 24 Okay. Then, Mr. McMaster?

MR. McMASTER: Judge, I apologize. The State has RYAN REPORTING

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also filed three motions and set them for a hearing for today.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

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MR. McMASTER: Those are relating to the production of various Defense experts and materials for our experts' review.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. McMASTER: If possible, we would like to have those heard today, because the sooner we can get those materials, the sooner our experts will be able to review them and make a determination about whether they need to evaluate or interview the Defendant directly and what direction the State needs to be taking with respect to calling them as witnesses in this case.

MR. MOORE: I'm all for expediting here, and so I would think maybe we could get those out of the way first.

THE COURT: Okay. Then, we'll do the State's -- I think they have three motions. We'll do the State's three motions first.

Okay. Hold on a second, it will take me a minute to get to those.

Okay. Mr. McMaster, you may proceed.

MR. McMASTER: Thank you, Your Honor. The State's filed three different motions directed to the Defense RYAN REPORTING

experts that have been produced. There are a total of four experts now. The original motion was directed to the first two that were disclosed in December, I believe, on December 17th, and I filed an amended motion today with respect to the production of the Defense experts' files, adding the additional two experts, which were added by the Defense on January 9th.

The first two experts were Dr. Jacquelyn Olander, and Susan Skolly-Danziger, I believe she's a doctor in pharmacology. I've added Joseph Wu, M.D., and Mark Herbst, H E R B S T, M.D., as they were supplemented on January 9th, to the Motion to Produce Files.

Taking the easiest motion first, the State is requesting that the experts Olander and Skolly-Danziger preserve the notes and file materials that they reviewed and based their conclusions on. I think it's a fairly non-controversial motion, and I would suggest that should be granted out of hand.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the Defense?

There's two motions, so let's address the Motion to

Compel Defense's Experts to Preserve Files first.

That's in reference to Olander and Danziger. And then

address the second one, which is the amended motion with

regard to the -- and addressed to Herbst and Wu.

MR. MOORE: First motion I don't object to. The RYAN REPORTING

Court without objection can enter the Order directing the witnesses to preserve their files.

The second one, I would ask that the State provide a specific list of what they want to get from the experts' files because they're not entitled to everything in those files. For example, the notes that the reports are based on, any notes related to work product, which would be discussions between attorneys and experts. And then there are some intellectual property limitations which — by the experts, by using tests and the scoring devices that come with the tests, they are limited by the producers, the authors of those tests, from disclosing those, unless it's to another expert.

So, there's some limitations as to what they are, our experts are required to provide and what they can provide.

So, if the State will give us a precise list, as we are required to do whenever we ask for the contents of let's say an FDLE, an expert's file, we have to provide a list of exactly what we want, and then if there's no objection, we are provided with those things.

So, that's my request that before the Court enters an Order about what our experts are required to produce, that the State provide with specificity a list of what RYAN REPORTING

1 | they want to get.

THE COURT: Okay. What I heard is the first motion, Motion to Compel Defense Experts to Preserve Files, that's dated December 18, 2013, that motion is granted.

MR. McMASTER: May I approach, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, you may. I'm going to do a big
Order --

MR. McMASTER: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- in the end, and we're going to prepare our own Order and have that for you. I'll hold on to that.

MR. McMASTER: I have these forms if you want them. If you don't want them, that's fine, also.

THE COURT: Actually, I'll hold onto that, and we'll see if we want to do that, or if we want to do a big
Order at the end. But I'll hold onto that.

Okay. And then I have the second motion -MR. McMASTER: It's the one to require the
Defendants to produce the experts' files.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the Motion to Require Defendant to Produce Experts' Files. That one's dated January 16th, 2014. What I heard was no work-product privilege and no intellectual property information.

Mr. McMaster, he's asking for more specifics.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am. Taking the easy ones RYAN REPORTING

first, I would start with Dr. Wu. From reading his 1 report, it appears that the only thing that Dr. Wu did was to review a PET scan that was produced by another provider, dated December 23rd of 2013. If that --4 5 MR. MOORE: And an MRI. MR. McMASTER: Oh, he also read the MRI? Is that 6 7 the same MRI that was done by Dr. Herbst? MR. MOORE: Well, let me clarify, if that will help 8 9 with this hearing. MRI was done in Orlando. Dr. Wu did an MRI DTI 10 with neuro-quantification. And that data was reviewed 11 by Dr. Wu, and it was secondarily reviewed by Dr. 12 13 Herbst.

MR. McMASTER: I'm not looking to produce the same documents twice or the same records twice. If the records that Dr. Wu have include the same record that was reviewed by Dr. Herbst, I'm just asking for copies of the scans that were done.

MR. MOORE: That's correct.

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MR. McMASTER: That takes care of two of the experts.

THE COURT: Okay. You're asking for --

MR. MOORE: But the contents of their files they aren't getting, if that's what they're looking for.

MR. McMASTER: We would like the scans and any gray RYAN REPORTING

scale that he's done to make comparisons with other scans.

THE COURT: Okay. The scans are the PET scans.

MR. McMASTER: Yes. PET scan and an MRI scan.

THE COURT: PET scan, MRI scan and any gray scans used to --

MR. McMASTER: Gray scales.

THE COURT: Gray --

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MR. McMASTER: Scale.

THE COURT: -- scale used for comparisons? Okay.

I'll have Mr. Moore respond at the end.

MR. McMASTER: With respect to Dr. Danziger, on Page 1 of her report that has been produced, she indicates that the documents she reviewed were the toxicology records of Brandon Bradley from Wuesthoff Reference Lab, and there was a litigation package dated April 13th of 2012. And Brandon Bradley's medical history from the Seminole County Jail from March 7th through August 5th of 2013.

THE COURT: On the toxicology records, can you give me where that's from again and the date?

MR. McMASTER: From Wuesthoff Reference Lab. And its title is a Litigation Package. And it's dated April 13 of 2012. I can give you copies of these documents that I highlighted.

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1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMASTER: And with respect to Dr. Olander, on Page 1 of her report she lists the background information that she reviewed. One was academic records of Cobb County School District, Two was academic records from Brevard Public Schools, Three is medical records from the Florida Department of Corrections, Four is medical records from Wuesthoff Hospital.

If that is a repeat of the ones from Dr. Danziger, we wouldn't need them to repeat it, but just in case they're not, we would like them.

Number Six was medical records from John E. Polk
Correctional Facility. And once again, if those are
repeats of Brandon Bradley's medical history from
Seminole County Jail listed with Dr. Danziger, we would
not need them twice.

We are not requesting any of the records that we produced in discovery in this case, such as the police reports, the DVDs of the Defendant's statements or anything along that line.

On Page 6 of the report of Dr. Olander, she lists a number of different tests and instruments that were administered. We are asking for all of the testing materials. I understand what Mr. Moore is saying about the proprietary information. The State has no objection RYAN REPORTING

1 if there is a concern about proprietary limitations on 2 what they can produce. I believe I heard him say that 3 it could be produced to another expert. So, we would not have an objection if those materials that are listed 4 on Page 6, which include the Advanced Clinical Solutions 5 6 Word Choice, Reliable Digit Span, LL2 Recognition, the 7 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition, WAIS The Delles (Phonetic) Cap of Executive Function 8 9 System, which is the DCEFS, Trial Making Test, Verbal Fluency Test, Wechsler Memory Scale IV, which is WMS-IV, 10 Logical Memory I, Logical Memory II, LM-II Recognition, 11 12 Design 1, Design 2, DE2 Recognition. There is a 13 Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory 3, it's a 14 SASSI-3, a Paulhus Deception Scales, PDS, Instruments 15 for Assessing, Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda 16 Rights and Standardized Assessment of Miranda Abilities.

We are asking for all those materials, including the tests that were administered, the results and the scoring materials. And once again, if there are proprietary materials, they can be turned directly over to our expert rather than to our office.

May I approach, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, you may. And this is a copy for

MR. McMASTER: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Moore, response from the Defense.

MR. MOORE: Your Honor, I will have to see once I get a copy of the Orders and provide them, which I will do immediately, to my experts, what their responses are as far as their limitations, and if we have any -- they have any issues with that, then I will immediately let Mr. McMaster know and he'll take whatever perfect steps he needs to take.

I don't object, but I haven't seen the Court's final Order, and I haven't provided to my experts and gotten their feedback, so I'm kind of shooting in the dark at this point. But that will be my response.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I'll grant the motion. When do you want this information, Mr. Moore? How much time do you think you'll need? Obviously, I assume Mr. McMaster's going to say the sooner the better.

MR. McMASTER: Yesterday would have been great.

THE COURT: Right. I assumed he was going to say that.

MR. MOORE: I'm all about soon, too. I mean, we're not cutting any corners, but I would like to get things on the road.

As soon as I get a written Order, Your Honor, I will immediately --

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1 THE COURT: You'll get the written Order. MR. MOORE: -- get those to my experts, and then 2 I'll know where I stand. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay, MR. McMASTER: May I approach? 5 6 THE COURT: Yes, you may. MR. McMASTER: Give Your Honor the forms I've 7 8 ordered. THE COURT: Okay. I want to make it more specific 9 than this, because I think they're going to need that. 10 Let's work on the premise that you're going to have 1.1 a written Order by Tuesday, because Monday's a holiday. 12 Tuesday's the 21st. Can we do it? I'm thinking a week 13 14 to ten days. MR. MOORE: Do what, Judge? 15 THE COURT: To produce the information. 16 MR. MOORE: I think that's realistic. Sooner, if we 17 18 can. THE COURT: Want me to say a week? That gives them 19 a month to work with it before trial, a little less than 20 a month. 21 MR. MOORE: Yeah, a week is fine. If I have 22 problems, I need more time, I'll come to the Court. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So, we'll get you the Order by 24

the 21st. And we'll ask that it be produced to the

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1 | State by the 28th.

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Now, Mr. McMaster, I heard proprietary limitations with regard to some documents that they may be requesting that it be produced to your expert. Do they know who your expert is?

MR. McMASTER: Not yet, Judge, but I will advise Mr. Moore who our experts are.

THE COURT: Okay. If that is the position of the Defense once they get this Order, and there's an issue with regard to production to your expert or if you don't get to them your expert timely, then I'll have to readdress it.

I'm assuming, based on what I know of the attorneys involved, that you all will work together with regard to this, and obviously if it becomes an issue, bring it to my attention right away and we'll readdress it right away.

And I'm making some assumptions here because I'm familiar with Mr. McMaster and I'm familiar with Mr. Moore, so I'm assuming that that's going -- we'll be able to resolve that between the two of you. But obviously if it can't, I am available and ready to address it.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. McMASTER: Judge, with respect to the third motion, the motion to have the Defendant examined by State experts, that specifically refers to the State experts that would be relating to the testimony of Dr. Jacquelyn Olander and Dr. Susan Skolly-Danziger.

From reading the reports, it appears that those are the only two doctors that actually examined or met with Mr. Bradley to interview him.

We won't be able to make a final determination as to whether our experts actually need to interview him until we get them the underlying materials and they've had a chance to review them and we can discuss it with But assuming that they do wish to conduct an them. interview, the State believes it has the ability to do so. However, I could use some clarification from the Court and the Defense.

The Defendant in this case on January 8th, filed a Disclosure of Defense Mental Health Expert Witnesses, listing the four experts that we have been discussing here today. They have also listed in that motion, and I have a copy for the Court, it's at Documentary Number 216 of the court file, but I know the Court doesn't always get the court files.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

MR. McMASTER: The Defense has filed a notice RYAN REPORTING

pursuant to Rule 3.202(c), that the Defendant discloses the following statutory and non-statutory mental health mitigation that the Defendant expects to establish through each of the above-listed witnesses insofar as it is possible.

Rule 3.202 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure is directed toward expert testimony of mental
mitigation during the penalty phase of a capital trial.
And it provides that the Defense must give notice and
allows for an examination by State experts.

However, since the Rule that they have cited is directed only to the penalty phase of the proceeding, the Rule provides that the examination by the State is to be conducted within 48 hours after the Defendant is convicted of capital murder.

We have been advised by the Defense that they intend to call the two experts at issue, Doctors Olander and Danziger, in their case in chief in the guilt phase of this case, as well as in the penalty phase, if necessary.

It is the State's position that the appropriate Rule for filing the notice would have been Rule 3.216, which provides for timing for filing of a notice of intent to rely on a mental health defense other than insanity.

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Under that Rule, the notice should be filed as soon as a good-faith determination has been made to utilize the defense, but in no event later than 30 days prior to trial. And under that Rule, subsection (f), it does allow for Court-ordered experts for other mental health defenses, and it allows for the State to have the opportunity to evaluate the Defendant for that purpose.

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There has been no notice filed by the Defense under Rule 3.216. It's the State's position that the oral notice that they intend to present this mental health testimony in the guilt phase of this proceeding allows the State to conduct their examination — or an examination of the Defendant by our own experts, and we are requesting that.

THE COURT: Okay. Clarification and response from the Defense.

MR MOORE: Your Honor, I've complied with this, I believe, with the only Rules that I need to comply with, which would be the identification of my mental health mitigation experts and the proposed mitigation under 3.202. So, we complied with that in a timely fashion.

And as to the guilt phase of the trial, we have responded under 3.220, which -- and provided the CVs and the reports of these witnesses, which makes it evident, makes it very obvious that these witnesses are expert RYAN REPORTING

witnesses. And I would agree that if they testify at the guilt phase, that they are subject to being deposed by the State.

And so, whether it's filed under 3.216 or 3.220, our intention is obvious, without revealing our tactical intent, but in terms of compliance with the Rules, we've done that. And I believe that the State would be then in a position to justifiably take the depositions of Dr. Olander and Dr. Skolly.

MR. McMASTER: I'm not asking to take depositions.

I believe I have the right to do that the way that they have provided them in discovery. The question is whether my experts have the right to interview Mr. Bradley, to conduct their own forensic interview of him just as their experts did in preparation for their trial testimony.

It's the State's position that under the Rule 3.216 that if the Defense intends to present mental health testimony in the guilt phase of this proceeding from Doctors Olander and Danziger, that that is in the form of a defense, whether it's to attempt to convince the jury to disregard the Defendant's confession or whatever.

The State's in an interesting position here, Judge.

We have been advised of the substance of the two

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experts' testimony. Each of the experts has -- Doctors

Olander and Danziger for different reasons -- have

rendered an opinion that Mr. Bradley was incapable of

voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights.

Despite that, we have been notified by the Defense that they do not intend to file a Motion to Suppress Mr. Bradley's confession. We have some concerns about that, obviously.

MR. MOORE: I might be able to cut to the chase here. I don't mean to cut Mr. McMaster off --

MR. McMASTER: That's quite all right.

MR. MOORE: -- but I agree that because we've disclosed Dr. Olander and Dr. Skolly pretrial, that they not only can be deposed, but because their testimony would involve their evaluations of Mr. Bradley, that the State is entitled to have their experts evaluate Mr. Bradley, pretrial. I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. So, this talks about disclosure, this motion. Oh, actually, this talks about the examination. So, the examination of Mr. Bradley by State's expert, that motion is granted.

MR. McMASTER: May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McMASTER: For whatever it's worth.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I may use these, I RYAN REPORTING

may not. I'll make that decision after court.

MR. McMASTER: And on that same theme, can we approach briefly, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

(Whereupon, there was a Bench conference as follows:)

MR. McMASTER: With respect to the Defense strategy not to file a Motion to Suppress given the findings by their two Defense experts, the State would ask at some point that the Court make an inquiry of the Defendant that he's aware of the substance of the experts' reports, and that he is aware that the Defense has decided not to file a Motion to Suppress and that he's in agreement with that strategy.

MR. MOORE: In response to that, I would object to any inquiry. I will represent as an officer of the Court, that of course we have discussed this at length with Mr. Bradley, I have.

He is well aware of the contents of the reports.

He's aware of the fact that we're not filing a Motion to

Suppress, and he is in agreement with is.

MR. McMASTER: I don't have any problem with Mr.

Moore at all. If he's representing that that happened,
that's fine. My concern is when this case is over, if
there has been a guilty verdict, Mr. Bradley's going to
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come back and say Mr. Moore never said anything to me about any of that stuff, and had I known, I would have had a totally different approach to how to go to trial on this case.

And it's a setup for a 3.850. And the State's requesting, whether the Court does it in-camera with the Defense and the Defendant alone, whether you do it in open court, wherever you do it, the State wants it part of the record, that the Defendant specifically is put on notice of the substance of the Defense reports, that he's aware of them and he's aware of the Defense strategy and he is in agreement with it.

THE COURT: I have a concern with that request. I have to assume, as an officer of the Court, that Mr. Moore's representations to the Court are accurate.

If there was a 3.850 filed with regard to that, I'm assuming that he would testify that he provided all that. And if Mr. Bradley testified that he did not get that, it would be an issue of credibility before the Court. And I have to assume that Mr. Moore's credible with regard to his representations.

MR. McMASTER: I don't know what some judge in the future is going to find about credibility. I don't know if Mr. Moore is going to be available to testify in the future. I do know that right here and right now as RYAN REPORTING

1 | the record stands, there is nothing to show that Mr.

Bradley is aware of any of these materials and that he's in agreement.

Just as the plea agreement disputes that we get all of the time. The Defendant comes back later saying they never communicated the plea agreement.

That's all we're asking to do.

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THE COURT: My concern with that request is if we do that, we would have to do that not only on that, but the trial Court would spend all its time confirming that every decision that the Defense attorneys made, was confirmed by their client. And I have an issue with that type of procedure.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, our concern obviously is the Defendant confessed to shooting Deputy Pill. This is a videotaped confession where their experts are giving a basis for not presenting it to the jury. And the Defense is representing they're going to attempt to convince the jury to disregard this (Inaudible - coughing in background). They're conceding that the statement's coming into evidence before the jury.

In my opinion and my experience, that's an unusual tactic. Not saying it's not a good one, I'm just saying it's an unusual one. And I think it's of such importance that at this stage it's critical for the

Court to inquire of the Defendant.

MR. MOORE: There is also a videotape of the shooting, as well. And it's not like that's all of the evidence in this case. And as the Court correctly pointed out, I mean, if we're going to piecemeal every decision we make as lawyers, then we will be trying this case until December in getting the Defendant to say, yeah, I know that and I agree with that or I don't agree with that. I mean, there's just got to be a point where the Defendant relies on his lawyers and the Court relies on the representation of counsel, which I'm at this point representing that I have done all the things that I said, and I will state that under oath.

And if at some point some future judge hears this when I'm passed out in a bar in Morocco, Court will have this record. And what I'm just saying under oath, I'm saying under oath, I did discuss it with Mr. Bradley and he is onboard with it.

MR. McMASTER: As an alternative to the Court making an inquiry, could we ask that the Court direct that Mr. Bradley sign a notarized statement indicating that he's been advised by Mr. Moore of these things and he can submit it to the Court under seal. As long as it's kept in the record under seal, I don't have any problem with it.

THE COURT: With all due respect, I have 1 2 philosophical difference as to how that needs to be 3 handled, and I have to rely on the credibility that Mr. 4 Moore's -- of his representation before the Court. 5 So, I will note the State's concern, and this Court is relying on the credibility of Mr. Moore and his 6 statements that Mr. Bradley is aware of the issue and 7 that he agrees with his trial counsels' strategy with 8 regard to not filing the Motion to Suppress. 10 Okay. Thank you. (Whereupon, the Bench conference was concluded, 11 after which the following proceedings were had:) 12 MR. McMASTER: That covers the State's motions, 13 14 Judge. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 15 16 Okay. Mr. Moore. 17 MR. MOORE: I'm going to assume, also, that the I called the Court's Court has a copy of each of these. 18 J.A. this morning and said she's copied them and 19 20 provided them to the Court. 21 THE COURT: I have received a copy of all 46 of your 22 motions. 23 MR. MOORE: Well, then, starting with the motions in the order that they're listed, the first one is a Motion 24

to Declare Section 921.141(7) Florida Statutes

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Unconstitutional and For Pretrial Determination of Admissibility of all Victim Impact Evidence Under the Cited Statutes.

First of all, I would preface my argument with the fact that I am well aware of the holdings in the United States Supreme Court decision of Payne versus Tennessee, and the Florida Supreme Court decision of Windham versus Florida, which hold that victim impact evidence is admissible in the penalty phase proceeding of a capital homicide trial, but it's not without limitation.

Just as the Defendant cannot keep out all evidence of victim impact, the State cannot introduce all proposed victim impact evidence. There's a balancing. It's under 90.403.

The authority that the State has to introduce victim impact evidence, not just those cases, but Florida Statute 921.141(7), which gives the State the right to introduce that evidence and Article 1, Section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution, which states what the rights of survivors are and next of kin. All of those rights, notwithstanding, according to the -- all of the cases, the two that I cited and all the cases that have followed, it's recognized that all of those are subordinate to the Defendant's right to a fair trial. So, there has to be a balancing of the Defendant's RYAN REPORTING

rights versus the State's rights and the rights of the survivors.

And since I don't know exactly what the State proposes to introduce, then all I can do is argue for a proposed approach to the presentation of victim impact evidence. And that would be that the statements of survivors be in writing, that they be reviewed by the Court, and if necessary, redacted, and that they be presented in that fashion.

I mean, the case law does not support completely excluding it. However, if the Court were -- Florida Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court were to revisit it, we would argue that the statute would allegedly be and arguably is unconstitutional because the jury's provided with very, understandably, emotional testimony, and not given any instructions as to what to do with it.

And although they are instructed that it's not an aggravating circumstance; in fact, it cannot help but be an aggravating circumstance, because of the emotional nature of it.

Even with the limitations that are put on it and that instruction to the jury, there is a danger of that becoming a non-statutory aggravating circumstance.

But that's already litigated; I understand that.

It's already deemed to be admissible at the state and RYAN REPORTING

the national level. So, I would ask that the Court
perhaps would want to review what the State proposes to
introduce by way of victim impact evidence before it
makes a final decision on that.

So, other than the outline that I proposed, the proposed way of presenting victim impact evidence to the jury, I don't know what else to point to to object to.

And so, perhaps this is premature, this motion is. But that is our position.

THE COURT: Okay. Hear response from the State.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, State's position is we do intend on presenting victim impact evidence, but I will tell the Court that what my practice has been. I will have it in writing, I will give it to the Defense prior to the testimony for them to review. We can hash out any issues that we have with it. The Court can be the final, obviously the decision-maker, and then we can add it or black out or change however the Court rules, and then the witness or witnesses that I intend to present the victim impact evidence through will read that, and I think that's from the State's standpoint, the safest way to do that, and I think that addresses Defense concerns.

But obviously our position is, it is constitutional and we do intend to present it.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to the motion, I'll RYAN REPORTING

deny in part as to the unconstitutionality. And I'll reserve ruling as to the remaining issues to be addressed once the Defense receives the written statements. And then we can readdress it if need be.

MR. MOORE: Sure.

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THE COURT: I assume we'll have to readdress it at some point.

MR. MOORE: Yeah, if we get to that point, that's true.

Whenever the Court's ready, I'll move on.

THE COURT: Okay. As to Motion Number Two.

MR. MOORE: Demand for Disclosure of Favorable Evidence. This lists a lot of things which --

THE COURT: Mr. McMaster's standing up. I think that means something.

MR. McMASTER: He wins. Judge, we're aware of our obligations under Brady and the relating cases as to disclosing favorable evidence to the Defense. We have in fact disclosed everything that has been provided to us in connection with this case, and we will continue to do so throughout the trial.

MR. MOORE: I'm aware of that. And I was going to say, I'm aware that they are aware of that, because I've worked with Mr. Brown and with Mr. McMaster before.

The one point that has come up since this motion RYAN REPORTING

1 was filed, and that is the co-defendant, Andrea 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Kerchner, has become a State witness, and in exchange for her testimony is going to be receiving a deal for a specific sentence. And gave a, as the Court may -well, the Court does know, of course -- a proffer of her testimony yesterday. And we will be provided on the Defense side with a transcript of -- and I presume a recording -- of that proffer. But there may have been things said before, as often happens, a proffer is taken or any statement is taken, there's a run through, and then the tape recorder moves on. And it would be in those areas before and after the recorded portion which we're going to get, where things may have been said, which could be favorable to the Defense, could be Brady material.

And I'm aware that these two prosecutors are aware of their obligations, but I wanted to specifically bring that up so that the State can be mindful that there may be some matters contained in that proffer, in addition to the other things that I've listed in here, which Mr. Brown and Mr. McMaster are well aware of.

So, I just want to make sure that that proffer is -- and everything that was said, not just what was recorded -- is encompassed in my request.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm aware that a proffer took RYAN REPORTING

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place. Obviously I wasn't privy to that.

Mr. McMaster, your response.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, the proffer was done. We had a court reporter present to record the entire proceeding. The court reporter began the proceeding by swearing in Ms. Kerchner. Everything that she said was recorded from the time she began speaking until the time the proffer was ended and she left the room.

THE COURT: You're saying there was no conversations before the court reporter commenced and there was no conversations after the court reporter left.

MR. McMASTER: Between the State and Ms. Kerchner, that's correct. She may have had some conversations with her attorneys, I don't know. I was not privy to those.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMASTER: And with respect to the agreements and the transcript, Mr. Moore is correct. As soon as the transcript is prepared, it will be supplied to him. Once the agreements are signed and finalized, those will be provided to him, also.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to Motion Number Two, I'm going to grant the motion.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, the only limitation that the State has on that is, they ask for all possible RYAN REPORTING

investigations of any witnesses. Certainly if the State's aware of investigation of witnesses that it intends to call at trial, we will supply that information. But there is no way for the State to be able to learn of all possible investigations of any and all potential witnesses in this case.

We obviously are concentrating on the witnesses that we intend to call at trial. And with respect to the local agencies or any investigations that our office has in fact been made aware of, we will certainly notify the Defense of those. But we can't give what we don't know about.

THE COURT: Okay. I think Mr. Moore would agree with that. Am I correct? They can't give what they don't know.

MR. MOORE: That's stated in my motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: It's only what they have. Even if it's constructive possession of, which is the -- perhaps police officers know it. If it's communicated to the State and they know that it might potentially be mitigating or a potential defense, then they are obligated to provide it, and Mr. McMaster has just stated that he is aware of that obligation.

I would ask also that the transcript be expedited RYAN REPORTING

and provided to us as quickly as possible. That is, the transcript of Ms. Kerchner's proffer of her testimony, whatever it is.

MR. McMASTER: It will be available before her plea.

MR. MOORE: When's the plea?

MR. McMASTER: Next Thursday.

THE COURT: The 23rd. I think that would be appropriate and timely.

Okay. We'll move on to Motion Number Three.

MR. MOORE: This is a Motion to Declare Section 921.141 paren 2 and 3 Florida Statutes, Unconstitutional Because Mitigation Must Outweigh Aggravation.

Again, I'm aware of the case law which interpreted that statute as being constitutional; however, it creates a defacto presumption that that is appropriate. In other words, once a Defendant's found guilty, it's presumed that he will and should get the death penalty, unless the Defendant then proves that life should be an appropriate sentence.

So, that creates a greater burden on the Defendant than on the State, and the burden should not be on the Defense and it is, by virtue of the fact that the wording of this is reversed.

And again, that's in the statute in the sections that I just provided, and in Jury Instruction 7.11,

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which deals with the penalty phase, which also says that the Defendant must prove that mitigated circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances.

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For that reason, I would argue that it's unconstitutional; although I'm aware of the rulings by the Florida Supreme Court that are otherwise. That's my motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, there are a total of ten different motions attacking the death penalty statute as being unconstitutional. Several of them attacking it overall; a number of them attacking just very specific aggravators individually. I would suggest that it's probably easier to handle all of the combined constitutionality motions at one time.

But particularly with respect to the one in Number 3. The State has a case to present to the Court, it's Supreme Court of Florida case of Foster versus State, it was rendered on October 17th of 2013, and it dealt with this precise issue.

May I approach the Court?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McMASTER: The Caldwell issue about shifting the burden of proof and the argument that the statute requires the Defense to argue that their mitigation must

over weigh the aggravators. And if you look at Page 27 of the opinion, it's the printed Page 27, it's a different page, obviously, in the actual opinion.

Starting at head notes 54 and 55 on the bottom

left-hand corner, they specifically address that

particular issue and go through how all of these jury

instructions and all of the arguments made under

Caldwell versus Mississippi, which is the main case

cited by the Defense on this issue, do not violate the

constitution. So, we would ask that motion under Number

3 be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. The motion under Number 3 is denied.

Number 4.

MR. MOORE: Yes, ma'am. Motion for Notice of Aggravating Factors. It's provided in State versus Steele, 921 So.2d 538 at Page 531, that it would be appropriate for the Court to direct the State to list its proposed aggravating circumstances.

Of course, I can guess what they are, but I shouldn't have to guess, and I shouldn't have to spend time on behalf of Mr. Bradley or any other client preparing to answer for aggravating circumstances that the State is not seeking.

There is a Rule of Procedure which puts on the RYAN REPORTING

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24 25 Defense an obligation to identify mitigating circumstances with no corresponding obligation on the State to do the same. And that is 3.202. And it would seem only fair that given that that burden is on the Defense under 3.202, and in light of the Florida Supreme Court acknowledging that it is appropriate for a Trial Court to enter such an Order, that the Court enter that Order.

It does not limiting on the State if the State can show -- I don't know what the standard is, I don't think any is established if there are additional aggravating circumstances, other than the ones that are listed, that they are not limited from presenting those to the Court, as well, and to the jury.

So, that the request is just briefly to ask the Court to enter its Order requiring the State to list the aggravating circumstances that the State intends to present to the Court and to the jury in this case.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, the case that the Defense argues says that it's okay for the Court to do that or the Court should do that. Actually holds that the Court didn't abuse its discretion or did not violate clearlyestablished principle of law in requiring the State to provide advanced notice of aggravating factors on which

it intended to rely.

What the Court actually held was whether to require the State to provide notice of aggravating factors upon which it intends to rely in a capital murder prosecution is within the Trial Court's discretion.

You can do it; you certainly have the discretion to do it. I hear Mr. Moore saying that he shouldn't have to guess as to what the aggravators are going to be that the State intends to utilize. However, it's interesting to note that in the motions that he did file asking for certain portions of the death penalty statute to be found unconstitutional, the aggravators he attacked were B, D, E and I. Those are aggravators that the State intended to use, so obviously he didn't have too much trouble in finding those.

The only two that he missed that the State does intend to rely on are Section A, that the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation.

And the aggravator of J, the victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his or her official duties.

None of which should be a secret under the facts that have been disclosed by the State in this case.

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So, I have just disclosed that Mr. Moore correctly guessed as to four of them, and he left out the other two that the State intends to rely on.

THE COURT: Okay. I would agree that the standard is the total discretion as to the judge, but I am going to grant the motion.

MR. McMASTER: Do you want us to put that in writing or is my oral --

THE COURT: I was going to say I think you just did it, but I would ask that you put that in writing, if you would, please.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. As to Number 5.

MR. MOORE: That would be the Motion to Request the Court State the Bases of its Rulings, if requested. And the reason for that, of course, is to have — to provide the best possible appellate review in a case where if there is a death sentence, it will automatically be reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court. And if it's going to be properly litigated at the trial level, and in a situation where we are requesting the Court to state the basis of its ruling, respectively, of course, what the rule is that the Court is basing the ruling on, what the law is, what statutes, then we can address it as thoroughly and completely at the trial level as we

can.

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That would enable us then to perhaps, again, respectfully, find cases which might suggest a different ruling for the Court to make. And can be properly litigated at the trial level.

But we're not requesting that every time the Court make a ruling that it state the case law, the rule and so forth. But if there are situations where we are requesting that the Court provide the basis for that ruling, it is done for us to perfect the record in a way that will give the Florida Supreme Court a most broadbased and a most thorough basis for its ruling for its review of the sentence, if it gets to the Florida Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: So, what I'm asking is, if during the course of the trial, we are sentencing or other hearings pretrial, that the Court makes a ruling, and we say, will the Court state a basis for its ruling, that the Court do so. That's what we're asking.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to give the State an opportunity to respond. I'm going to deny this request, with all due respect.

But Mr. Moore, I will tell you that the Court will make its best effort to rule based on the evidence and RYAN REPORTING

the law presented by the parties, and do its best to state on the record the basis for its ruling, either on the record or in writing, but I'm not going to enter an Order with regard to this. I'm going to deny the request.

MR. MOORE: And on that note, Judge, if during the course of the trial we disagree with the Court's ruling, and it could happen --

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. MOORE: -- and we then may ask the Court to hear our -- of course, the Court will hear our side of it -- but then to at least entertain the idea of us providing case law contrary to that. And I know the Court will do that, as well. But we may ask the Court to state its basis.

And I understand the Court's not ruling that it will, but we may be in a situation where we will be asking the Court. And of course, this is all done respectfully, not to try to argue with the Court. But once we understand that we're not precluded, we're not foreclosed from asking the Court to state the basis of its ruling --

THE COURT: I'm not going to enter a written Order, but you can request that the Court give you -- you can make that request.

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Okay, all right. Number 6.

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MR. MOORE: Your honor, there are cases contrary to what I'm asking in this motion, which is entitled Motion to Preclude Capital Punishment as a Possible Sentence.

And they are the Parker case and the Blackwelder case, which are cited in the motion.

The basis for the motion is aggravating circumstances are not identified in the indictment, which under the ruling of Apprendi, would be required, although -- and Ring, as well -- although the Florida Supreme Court has declined to follow Ring, and has ruled against us in these two cases that I just provided.

And also because the indictment does not allege aggravating circumstances, it does not allege a capital offense. Because as alleged, it leaves out an element of a capital offense. Capital offense requires proof of an aggravating circumstance, at least one, and that's a fact that must be proven but beyond a reasonable doubt unanimously by a jury, and that's the Ring case, that's the Apprendi case.

But however, under Florida's death penalty capital sentencing scheme, the State is not required to allege aggravating circumstances, and can merely present them at the penalty phase of the trial.

So, the argument here is the State has not alleged RYAN REPORTING

a capital offense because it has not alleged any elements of the capital offense which would specifically be the aggravating circumstances, and because the statutory scheme permits that proceeding, that procedure, it's unconstitutional. And because the State has not, on the basis of my argument, alleged a capital offense, then the jury should not be questioned on the death penalty and the State should not be able to seek the death penalty in this case.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, the State, of course, is going to adopt the two cases that he acknowledges rule against him from 2003 and 2005.

Meanwhile, in the intervening eight years since their most recent case in the motion, the Supreme Court has addressed those specific issues two more times -- much more than two -- two most recent, some of the more recent, specifically are Supreme Court of Florida Hoskins versus State in April of 2007 and Martin versus State from September 20th of 2012, with that rehearing denied February 1st of 2013.

Law has not changed since the last case that Mr. Moore cited, says that our system is constitutional and he's not entitled to what he's asking.

THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 6 is denied.
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MR. MOORE: Motion Number 7 is the Motion to Declare 921.141(1) Florida Statutes Unconstitutional. And in the alternative, to bar the statutes of hearsay evidence at the penalty phase. And what that subsection provides is the State may introduce hearsay at the penalty phase as long as the Defendant has a reasonable opportunity to rebut it, but since that statute was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court passed on the Crawford case, and that has since been adopted as a law in Florida by the Florida Supreme Court.

And more specifically, the case of Rogers and Franklin, as I stated in my motion, Rogers versus State 948 So.2d 655 at 663 in 2006, and Franklin versus State, 965 So.2d 779 at Page 88 in 2007, held that the Crawford case applies to the penalty phase.

So, we would, number one, argue that the Florida
Statute is unconstitutional because it's a violation of
Crawford and that it permits the introduction of
hearsay, and number two, and if the Court denies that,
we'd ask the Court to enter an Order that the State is
not permitted to introduce hearsay, that is testimonial
hearsay, at -- or any kind of hearsay -- at the penalty
phase.

THE COURT: Okay. Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, based on the three cases that RYAN REPORTING

the State has already submitted to the Court, Foster,
Hoskins and Martin, it's clear that the Florida Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute.

State's aware of the Rogers case and the limitation on presenting hearsay during the penalty phase and will certainly follow the law with respect to the testimony we present.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion with regard to the constitutionality. And I'll reserve ruling until a specific objection on hearsay is posed at the penalty phase. I don't want to -- I mean, may be some hearsay that is not admissible, and so I don't want to -- by denying your motion with regard to unconstitutionality, doesn't mean I'm denying it with regard to other issues that may come up with regard to a specific objection.

So, I'll reserve that at the penalty, for you to re-argue your objection at the penalty phase.

Okay. Give me just a moment. Mr. Moore, how come you don't have proposed Orders to hand me? I'm okay. With regard to --

MR. MOORE: I'll have them before the end of the day, Judge. Just make a ruling granting my motion, and I'll stop what I'm doing and print it out right now.

THE COURT: We're going to prepare the Orders, so we'll have those.

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Okay. Number 8.

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MR. BROWN: Judge, we would ask the Court to follow RYAN REPORTING

MR. MOORE: That would be Motion to Declare Section 921.41(5)(I) Florida Statutes Unconstitutional as Written and Applied. That's the cold calculated premeditated aggravating circumstance.

It's number one, it's vague and it's over broad; number two, and because of that, provides no guidance to the jury; number three, it's not alleged in the indictment and therefore does not say that element of a capital offense under Ring and Apprendi, and it's not applicable here, which of course I'd have to be at a posture, having filed a C-4 Motion, and I'm not aware of any vehicle which permits me to attack an aggravating circumstance pretrial, other than to put it in the form of this motion and say that it doesn't apply here.

But the Court, of course, would have to have a factual basis to make a ruling on that basis. I'm just throwing it out there. That one ground, which is that it doesn't apply.

But as to the other three grounds of Overbreath (Phonetic) and Daignus (Phonetic), not alleged in the indictment and no quidance to the jury that it would then render that statute constitutional on its face.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

-- obviously there has been I would say hundreds of Florida Supreme Court cases addressing this particular aggravator. It has never been found to be unconstitutional. We'd ask the Court abide by those, and as well as the Ring aspect of this motion, and ask the Court to deny it.

And obviously the Court will have the final decision prior to instructing the jury whether we've met our burden of proof to get this aggravated to the jury, then if it does go to the jury, then the Court is the ultimate decision maker in finding whether we've proven it, if there's a death recommendation.

So, factual circumstances will be for the jury and ultimately -- and the Court to decide, but at this point we'd ask the Court deny the motion.

THE COURT: I'll deny it as to the being facially unconstitutional. And I'll reserve ruling as to whether it's applicable or not, depending on what comes before the Court with regard to proof.

Okay. Number 9.

MR. MOORE: Number 9, Objection to Death

Qualification of the Jury, Motion to Bar Imposition of
the Death Sentence.

A memorandum of law in support of that motion. The basis of it is not just related to one aggravating  $$\operatorname{\mathtt{RYAN}}$$  REPORTING

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circumstances but all, and that it does not require that aggravating circumstances, which are elements of a capital offense, that they be charged in the indictment.

Under the Florida Death Penalty scheme, the Defendant is denied a fair jury because of the elimination of people from sitting on the jury who have strong feelings against the death penalty. On the other hand, people who feel that the death penalty is appropriate are permitted to sit on the jury.

And so, the jury is skewed to find for death under the case law and the research in the case law of the Hobe (Phonetic) case, which is in a later motion asking for individual sequestered voir dire, it has been established that a death-qualified jury is a convictionprone jury. And that is in a sense of, based upon factors which aren't related to the facts in evidence at the trial, it's just that they are more inclined to convict as just a general principle. And there have been scholarly articles and research papers and research done which established that as a fact.

So, under the Florida sentencing scheme, because death-scrupled people are permitted to sit on the jury, whereas people who are against the death penalty are removed from the jury, the jury itself is composed in a way that's unfair to the Defendant.

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Florida is the outlier state, which is the only state which permits a death recommendation on a mere majority, and the only state where either an aggravating — all of the other states, they require an aggravating circumstances or the death recommendation or both, be either unanimous or by a super majority, and unless I'm wrong, I believe all the other states require one or the other to be found unanimously.

Under the Federal system, the United States requires that the jury recommendation be unanimous. But in Florida, it's a mere majority. And so, for that reason, we would move for the Court -- and I am aware of the case law, which I've cited in my motion, which holds otherwise -- I'm asking for the Court to enter its Order finding the Florida Statute 921.141 unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. BROWN: State would ask the Court to deny the motion, follow the existing case law by the Florida Supreme Court.

THE COURT: With regard to Defense Motion Number Nine, said motion is denied.

Okay. Motion Number Ten.

MR. MOORE: Motion to Declare Section 921.141(5)(e)

Florida Statutes, which is the victim was a law

enforcement officer, to declare that unconstitutional as

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written and as applied. This would be doubling with 1 respect to the other aggravating circumstances I think 3 the State may seek. I think they've already announced that they are going to seek witness elimination. 5 not alleged in the indictment. The substance of this factor is controlled by the Florida Supreme Court in 6 violation of the separation of powers. In other words, 8 it was enacted by the Florida Supreme Court, when it should have been enacted by the legislature, and because 9 of that, the separation of powers would render the 10 statute unconstitutional. 11

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And, let's see, I've already provided. It's not alleged in the indictment.

So, for those reasons we'd ask -- and again, I'm aware of the case law which holds to the contrary -- the Court enter its Order to find that aggravating circumstance unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. BROWN: Judge, same response, we'd ask the Court follow existing case law, deny the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to Motion Number Ten, said motion is denied.

Motion Number 11.

MR. MOORE: Is a Motion to Declare Section 921.141(5) bravo Florida Statutes, unconstitutional as RYAN REPORTING

written and as applied. And that is the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance and that it does not limit the class of people who are eligible for the death penalty.

One of the reasons is it can include a prior violent felony which is not final. It could include a prior violent felony which is on appeal. And it includes violent felonies occurring before sentencing and not before the commission of the offense.

And in the presentation of evidence and the prior violent felony, the State is permitted to an extent to provide the factual background of the prior violent felonies, which would include issues such as race and gender and socioeconomic status, which are matters which should not be heard by a jury trying to make a recommendation on whether to sentence the Defendant to death in this particular case.

So, for that reason as applied and on its face, that section is unconstitutional. We'd ask the Court to enter an Order to that effect.

And I'm aware of the case law which holds otherwise.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: I think he just acknowledged he's aware of the case law that holds otherwise. We just ask RYAN REPORTING

the Court to rely on that.

THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 11 is denied. Okay. Number 12.

MR. MOORE: Is a Motion to Declare 921.141(5) delta, the felony murder aggravating circumstance of the Florida Statute, for the Court to declare that unconstitutional as written and as applied.

Again, it's not alleged in the indictment, it does not limit the class of death eligible. It's an aggravating circumstance, it repeats an element of the effects and just because a Defendant's convicted of a felony murder such as a robbery, which is alleged in this case, it could be the basis for an aggravating circumstance, irrespective of the fact that there may not have been any premeditation.

And so, that does not narrow, it broadens a class of people who are eligible for the death penalty.

As stated in the motion, the case law which has addressed that issue by the Florida Supreme Court, which disagrees with me, and that would be my motion.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Same response. Ask to follow the existing case law, deny the motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 11 is denied.

Motion Number 13.

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MR. MOORE: That was 12. Number 13 is a Motion for Finding the Fact by the Jury. First of all, in the first paragraph cited State versus Steele, which held that it would be a violation of the fundamental requirements of the law for the Court to enter an Order or permit the jury to be presented with a jury requirement specific finding of aggravating circumstances.

And so, however, I mean, you don't ask, you don't get. And so I'm asking at the trial level and hoping that the Florida Supreme Court will consider this in a more favorable light if it gets there, for the appellate — mandatory appellate review to have any meaning at all, the Appellate Court has to know what the jury decided.

And if the jury's required to find an aggravating circumstance unanimously, and they're given up to 15, which is I think that's the number of aggravating circumstances we're up to. Not that they're going to get that many in this case, it's impossible to tell whether they found one or two or five or 12, which is the number of people on the jury. And that can hardly be said that the finding of any aggravating circumstances is unanimous. Not unanimous, but beyond — that is not a finding done on a reasonable doubt unless we know the RYAN REPORTING

number of jurors who are voting in favor of finding a 1 2 specific aggravating circumstance. Or -- but you know, it's impossible to tell what their vote is unless a 3 specific verdict form is completed by the jury. 4 And I'm aware that the Steele case says you can't 5 do that, but I'm asking at the trial level and hoping 6 7 that the Florida Supreme Court will listen to that request if we get to there, if we get to the Florida 8 9 Supreme Court. THE COURT: Okay. Hear response from the State. 10 MR. BROWN: The State's asking the Court follow the 11 essential requirements of the law and deny Defense 12 13 motion. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 13 is denied. With regard to Motion Number 14 --15 MR. MOORE: The lethal injection motion I did not 16 17 file. 18 19

THE COURT: Okay. I was going to say I do not have that motion.

MR. MOORE: Right. That's why.

THE COURT: So, there's no Number 14. So, the Court takes no action with regard to that.

MR. MOORE: Next will be 15.

COURT: Proceed to Number 15, yes, sir.

MR. MOORE: During the course of the trial, I would RYAN REPORTING

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expect -- can't say, maybe expecting is too strongly stated -- but there needs to be an awareness from the Bench of when things get heated, when things -- and toward the end of a long trial, then patience wears out in terms of everybody in the courtroom, that during the heat of battle things get said, and this motion seeks to avoid that, to obviate that, and just to bring to the attention of the counsel for the State and for the Defense, as well, the importance of reigning it in and presenting argument which is proper.

And under the circumstances, that's going to be a challenge in this case on both sides, but that's what this motion is directed to. And one of the factors here which is going to be a big issue will be mitigation.

And for argument which could be described on the State's side as arguing that evidence of mental illness or intoxication is not really mitigation, which will be improper, in any way making a Caldwell argument that the responsibility for the sentence is in any way removed from the jury and emphasize that it's on the Judge, those would be improper types of argument.

I've listed all of the types of improper argument which the Florida Supreme Court's addressed. And I've tried cases with Mr. Brown and Mr. McMaster before, and I don't expect -- what I have come to know as an ethical RYAN REPORTING

way of conducting themselves, I don't expect that to

change, but in the heat of battle, things happen, and

I'm asking that the Court be sensitive to that and that

the State Attorneys be sensitive to that, too.

So that, just as a general matter, I think it would be more appropriate to raise those objections as they come up, if they come up, and to object and get rulings at that time; but however, I'm making that presentation to the Court at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. BROWN: Judge, we're aware what our obligations are under the case law. We intend to follow that. I've not had a case reversed on appeal yet, and I don't intend to start with this one.

So, we're going to abide by the requirements and the restrictions on our behavior and don't anticipate a problem.

THE COURT: Okay. I am familiar with Mr. McMaster and Mr. Moore. I have tried lengthy trials with both of them. Never so far as seen either one of you raise your voice or have a hair out of place when you're arguing any motion.

So, having said that, I don't expect to have an issue with that. I'm not familiar with some of the -I'm familiar with the other attorneys; I'm not familiar RYAN REPORTING

with them in a lengthy trial setting, but I don't anticipate this is going to be an issue.

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I mean, I don't know whether to grant it or deny it, because my expectation is that we're going to have proper argument and everyone's going to be professional and abide by the rules of professionalism and the rules set forth by the Florida Bar with regard to that issue.

So, having said that, I don't know whether I grant this motion or deny this motion. I could grant it as to all attorneys present before the Court in this motion. I don't want to just direct it towards the State. I think it should be directed towards all attorneys if I do grant it.

MR. MOORE: I did include that, myself in there. I intend to comport myself ethically in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: So, if the Court wants to grant it, that's great.

THE COURT: With regard to all attorneys, I'll grant the motion.

Okay. Number 16.

MR. MOORE: Motion to Compel the State to Furnish

Penalty Phase Witness List. Defense is required to

present and has done, and we have filed a 3.202 motion

identifying our mitigation witnesses, penalty phase

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witnesses. We've also provided a lengthy list of witnesses which I will now identify as penalty phase witnesses, with the exception of Dr. Olander and Dr. Skolly, but the rest are penalty phase witnesses.

And we would ask the State identify those witnesses that it intends to call at the penalty phase. We've gotten just a blanket witness list in response to our demand, which under the Administrative Order, the State is required to give us in its response a witness list which has upwards of 200 names on it, so it's impossible, other than just taking wild guesses who's going to be testifying at the penalty phase.

So, we'd ask the Court to enter an Order requiring the State to identify those witnesses it intends to call at the penalty phase.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Now that Mr. Moore has identified the witnesses that he provided, the 26 witnesses that he just listed as Defendant's witnesses, supplemental witnesses recently, as witnesses for the penalty phase, is that a statement that those witnesses will not be called in the guilt phase?

MR. MOORE: Olander, Dr. Olander, Dr. Skolly will, and the other witnesses will be penalty phase witnesses.

MR. McMASTER: Only.

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MR. MOORE: Yes.

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MR. MOORE: Okay. Well, all right, let me --RYAN REPORTING

MR. McMASTER: Judge, I don't believe it's required by the Rule. I think the Court probably has the discretion to order it. We have provided all of the discovery in this case, including the witnesses' names and addresses, copies of their statements, copies of the interviews by the police department.

Just as with the aggravators that Mr. Moore was able to discern that we were going to use, he knows who the witnesses are that we would have to call to establish those aggravators.

So, I don't think it's necessary. The State would object to it.

THE COURT: Okay. Just as I did the other motion. I think the Defense could probably figure it out, but I don't think that's their obligation to try to guess in any way, shape or form with regard to that so I'm going to grant the motion.

MR. MOORE: Well, then, any qualification I put on my intended purpose for these witnesses is withdrawn. Fair game. Other than having identified Dr. --

THE COURT: I granted your motion.

MR. MOORE: I thought you said you didn't.

THE COURT: No, I granted our motion.

THE COURT: I granted your motion. 1 2 MR. MOORE: I got to thinking --THE COURT: You were anticipating a denial, but I 3 granted your motion. 4 MR. MOORE: There are about a dozen witnesses with 5 the Wuesthoff Reference Lab, and it's possible that some That's a of those may be called at the guilt phase. 8 possibility. 9 Let me just step over here for a second. THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. MOORE: Okay. So, any witness on the list which 11 would be involved with the toxicology, lab or the jail 12 individuals who were present when a blood and urine 13 sample were taken from Mr. Bradley, those people could 14 be called at the guilt phase, but the rest are penalty 15 16 phase witnesses. THE COURT: Your motion refers to the State to 17 compel to furnish a penalty phase witness list, so that 18 motion is granted. 19 MR. MOORE: All right. 20 21 THE COURT: Okay. And we can move -- I didn't set a time limit for that. Do you want a time limit? 22 MR. MOORE: As soon as possible, so we can --23 THE COURT: I didn't set a time limit for the other 24

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one, as well. Mr. McMaster.

MR. McMASTER: Ten days.

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THE COURT: Okay. You're okay with ten days, Mr.

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McMaster?

faster.

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MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

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THE COURT: Okay. Within ten days, that goes to Motion Number 16, and that also should go with -- I'll

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do that with Motion Number 4, as well.

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MR. McMASTER: That's fine.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. McMASTER: Your Honor, excuse me, if the Court

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were here everyday when I'm here, I'll be happy to do it

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THE COURT: Okay. I don't know if I can do that.

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Okay. Number 17. That motion's not before me, so

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I'm not addressing that.

respect to this motion.

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Go ahead.

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MR. MOORE: Well, any of the grounds in this, which

is a -- let me state what it is. Motion to Declare for

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the Death Penalty and Section 921.141 Florida Statutes

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Unconstitutional Because of Faulty Appellate Review,

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I've already argued some of the grounds in other

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motions, but I'm going to make this argument anyway with

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That the Florida Statute is unconstitutional in

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that it does not provide adequate guidance to the jury RYAN REPORTING

with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances or what to do with them.

In that it provides an inadequate guidance with respect to victim impact evidence and it gives no vehicle for establishing which if any aggravating circumstances are found beyond a reasonable doubt.

So, other than these vague instructions which are given to the jury, there is no way of knowing whether the requirements of a properly found and opposed death sentence, that is that the aggravating circumstances be found beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no way of knowing if the jury has complied with that requirement.

And so, the Appellate Court is in a vacuum and cannot tell whether the statute has been complied with. So, there is inadequate Appellate review, and the constitutional mandate is not met, and for that reason, the statute, the Florida Death Penalty Scheme is unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, obviously under the Foster,
Martin and Hoskins cases that we have submitted to the
Court, the Florida Supreme Court has stated that the
statute's constitutional.

And in Foster, they specifically say the standard penalty phase jury instructions fully advise the jury of RYAN REPORTING

the importance of its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role of the jury and do not violate Caldwell versus Mississippi.

It's obvious that the Florida Supreme Court, which is an Appellate Court and is directly involved in Appellate review of the death penalty cases, is confident that its Appellate review is full, it's complete and it's adequate and constitutional.

We would ask that that motion be denied.

THE COURT: Motion Number 17 filed on behalf of the Defense is denied.

Okay. Number 18.

MR. MOORE: Number 18, Defendant's Motion for Jury Instruction Delineating all Mitigating Factors under Florida Statute 921.141(6)paren Hotel(h).

We're asking for the Court -- in this case there is some Florida Supreme Court precedent in the cases that I've cited supporting this request that the jury be provided with all of the aggravating circumstances which the Defense is capable of putting forward, and not be limited to the catchall mitigating circumstance which is provided in the statute, which is just a generic everything related to the Defendant, the case and the sentence.

But in the cases that I've cited, particular Downs RYAN REPORTING

versus Moore, 801 So.2d 906, Judge Anstead endorsed the idea with Justice Parenti, that the catchall instruction may be inadequate and that it's entirely appropriate for the jury to be informed, instructed on all of the aggravating circumstances that are proposed by the Defense.

And there will be more than one in this case. As there was in the Downs case and the Belcher case and the Duest case, for mitigating, mitigating, is what I meant.

In the Belcher case, 851 So.2d 678, Justice Parenti again urged in her concurring opinion that the catchall statutory mitigating factor failed to provide the jury with adequate guidance on how to determine what factors are mitigating.

And also a similar statement by her in her concurring opinion on the Duest case, D U E S T, versus State, 855 So.2d 33. That's a 2003 Florida Supreme Court decision.

So, it's within the Court's discretion. The State will be listing all of its aggravating circumstances, and the Defense should be permitted to list all of its mitigating circumstances. And there is precedent for that and approval by the Florida Supreme Court of that procedure.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

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MR. BROWN: Judge, the difference is, the State, we have to list all of our aggravating circumstances because the jury is limited just to those aggravating circumstances.

There's the catchall provision here which allows the jury to look at, go beyond these statutory mitigators and look at other mitigation evidence that the Defense provides, and they don't have that same limitation that the State has.

We're aware of what Justice Parenti, her position That's never been the majority position of the is. Florida Supreme Court. They have never reversed a Court that simply relied on the catchall provision. at this time it's a little bit premature. I think the appropriate time for the Court to rule on this is when they present their mitigation evidence and then present their proposed jury instruction. I think the Court at that point, it's within your discretion. You can rely on the catchall provision, you can list specifically every one they request or you narrow it down. only real way to make that decision for us to appropriately respond is, when we get to that point, if we get there and when we get there, to address it request by request.

So, I'd ask the Court to reserve on this motion RYAN REPORTING

until we reach that point in the penalty phase.

MR. MOORE: What I'd point out that is significant, that the only times that the Florida Supreme Court has addressed the issue, they have approved it. And there has never been a Supreme Court decision which disapproves of that procedure.

And so, the Court can infer from that, it's entirely within this Court's discretion and would not be inappropriate nor prejudicial to the State. If the voice of the Florida Supreme Court, although in a minority, approves it and the speaking as a panel the Florida Supreme Court has not disapproved of that proceeding, then it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to grant that motion.

And so, we can revisit it later when we are talking about what exactly we have and what we want on that list. But if the Court's going to reserve ruling, I respect that and we can address it later. But I want the Court to consider that it has not been disapproved by any Court.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll reserve ruling with regard to Motion Number 18.

Okay. Motion Number 19.

MR. MOORE: Let's see. This is the Motion in Limine
Regarding Procedures. I would ask that as stated on
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Page 2, just a basic request, which has been granted in every case that I've done, and there's no precedent one way or the other in cases that I'm aware of, that as to mitigating circumstances, they not be referred to as non-statutory mitigating circumstances or that any distinction be made by the Court or by counsel for either side.

And as to the next item, which would be the presence of media, family members, uniformed officers, shackling of the Defendant, Mr. Pirrolo is going to address the presence of uniformed officers of the court.

As far as who can be present in court, we think it would be more appropriate to address that at the time that we invoke the Rule of Sequestration and we see who the State and who the Defense intends to have present in the court. We can state our objection to them.

We're asking that the media be kept in a designated area which is as unobtrusive as possible. They certainly have their rights to be here, but not that's going to interfere with the trial or distract the jurors or become a feature of the trial. So, we would ask the Court to be mindful of that.

And we've already addressed the security issue at the Bench.

The only other matter that we haven't addressed, RYAN REPORTING

then, again, would be the interval between the guilt and the penalty phases.

We would ask the Court to be open to the idea of the break of the two or three day time period. We have witnesses who are not in Florida, we have witnesses who are not in Brevard County, and they have very busy schedules, and they may require some time to wrap up what they're doing. Since we can't state with any precision when they need to be here, we may require some latitude from the Court in scheduling their presence.

And so, I don't see how the Court can rule on that now, other than to at least acknowledge that there could be some issues here, and be open to the suggestion of number one, an issue, maybe some extra time between guilt and penalty phase, and the issue of who can be present in Court during the trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. BROWN: Judge, first, as far as referring to any mitigators as non-statutory or any other such terms, we agree to that, we have no intention of ever delineating to the jury statutory or non-statutory or any other such term. So, we have no problem with that.

Judge, as far as the presence of media, I think that's within the Court's discretion, setting up the structure of the courtroom.

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Obviously they have a right to be here. But as far as where they're at, I think that's between the Court deputies and I'm certain the Court's going to set it up in a way that it's not going to affect the trial. And I've had trials with a lot of media coverage, and they have no intention, at least in prior trials, of becoming the center of attention. They want to just simply be there and as unobtrusive as possible.

As far as presence of the police, Judge, this is an open courtroom --

MR. MOORE: We're not addressing that now. I'm sorry, I wasn't clear on that. We have that separate motion, and Mr. Pirrolo will present that, so I'm asking respectfully that we defer until that is properly presented by Mr. Pirrolo.

THE COURT: Okay. We talked about the family, and Mr. Moore even said in his motion that that's going to depend on when the Rule gets invoked and as to who the State expects to be present in the courtroom and who doesn't. So, I think that would be better left to address at that time.

What about time between the trial and penalty phase. I think I'm going to have to address that at the time, as well. It may work out that there's time anyway, it may not, depending on how long the trial RYAN REPORTING

goes. We'll just have to readdress it.

be an issue.

Obviously, Mr. Moore, if it's a matter of getting someone flown in and getting someone here, I'm going to be sensitive to that. If it's a week, I'm going to have an issue with it. If it's a few days, it probably won't

May work out. There's a couple of days there at the end that I'm not going to be here. So, it may work out, depending on where the trial goes, it may work out at that time, as well. We'll just have to see how that is.

Anything else on behalf of the State with regard to that?

With regard to the media, I know there's been some requests by our media specialist. I haven't had an opportunity to meet with her yet. I did discuss with my deputies.

When we do jury selection -- no one's made a request to change courtrooms, and so I haven't entertained that. If we can stay in this courtroom, that would be my preference. If we need a bigger courtroom, 4-D is the biggest courtroom. I'm not opposed to that. No one's made that request, so I haven't entertained that. I'm only going to entertain that if someone makes that request.

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Like I said, this is our courtroom, everyone's comfortable in this courtroom, I'd prefer this But I'm not adverse to having to move if courtroom. this courtroom doesn't accommodate everyone. where this courtroom may not accommodate everyone is during jury selection.

I did speak to my deputies about where everyone would sit during jury selection because the first three rows of the back on each side is going to be occupied. Talked about where the family would sit, we talked about where the observers would sit with my court deputies, and where the media would sit.

I haven't had media overflow other than the one And I've always given them the back and they've been in the back and they haven't, as far as I can observe, they haven't in any way obstructed the court. I've had the media present in other proceedings before and I've never had that as an issue.

I'm open to discussion about that if it becomes an issue or if it is an issue, I'm open to discussion about that. But my concern is like during the jury selection, depending on how many people are going to be here, then that may become an issue.

Obviously my intention was that there's going to be two rows open on this side, two rows open on that side, RYAN REPORTING

media would have this side, or I might move them to that side, but they've always preferred this side, I think they have a better view. And move the family to the other side just during jury selection, it would be the back row for sure, and then the back two rows would be - I mean, reserve one row for the family and one row for anyone who wants to observe.

And I would encourage people that during jury selection would not be the most opportune time to have everyone come to court.

MR. MOORE: While we're on that subject, are we going to have enough room in this courtroom to accommodate the entire venire, which is going to be huge?

THE COURT: We've ordered 53 for each day, for five days. There would be 21 here. I don't have my little chart, so I can't remember -- actually, I do. Let me tell you, hold on.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . MOORE: Got family and media and security.

THE COURT: No, we discussed that. Somewhere in the -- I mean, I could accommodate twice as many that's here today. If it's a lot, then we're not going to be able to accommodate that.

That's why I said jury selection would not be the most opportune time to have people come. Obviously I RYAN REPORTING

expect some family members to be here during all phases of the trial. But jury selection is going to be where it's going to be the tightest.

I've ordered 53 jurors for February the 24th,
February the 25th, February the 26th, February the 27th
and February the 28th. We would have 21 in the box. We
would take up the first three rows of each side. It
would be five, five and six on the right side, and five,
five and six on the left side. That leaves, if I'm
correct -- I can't tell how many rows are back there -are there five or four?

MR. BROWN: Four.

THE COURT: That would leave the media to be over here, and I assume with all due respect to the family, the media wants to be over here because that's an unobstructed view of the courtroom. On this side sometimes the attorneys obstruct the view more. And that the family would be in the back row. And if there's people that are present, they would be in the back row.

Jury selection is not usually the most attended event, that's my experience. But if we can't accommodate that, we'll have to move to the larger courtroom.

My understanding of the larger courtroom, it's RYAN REPORTING

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more convenient for the media, because they can come in and out without -- they have a separate little room.

So, they could come in and out without opening doors.

I've never had them be a problem, though. Our media has been very cooperative and very unobtrusive, never had that be a problem with them coming in and out. They're very quiet. But they can use their phones and they can use computers if they're in that other room. They can't do that so much here.

But my understanding of the big courtroom is that the acoustics are not as good. It's difficult to hear sometimes. So, I've never been in that courtroom for any length of time, so I haven't experienced that myself. I've done a couple of things in there, but not anything --

MR. MOORE: We have, it's terrible. So, perhaps we could start out in here. I was just raising it to see what the Court's thoughts --

THE COURT: I mean, I have addressed that, I have thought about that, it hasn't been arbitrary, I've spent some time on it. So, that's -- like I said, the only person I haven't talked to about that is Michelle Kennedy in Court Administration with regard to the media's request. But I understand they're asking for one feed, so that might not be an issue. That's my RYAN REPORTING

understanding. I haven't talked to her, though.

And my only concern is during jury selection, if there's going to be enough room. I don't know how many family members or how many observers intend to be here. It might be a little cramped with regard to that. But only during jury selection, I believe.

So, I'm going to leave it at that. I don't have any request yet. Maybe the State knows more or the Defense knows more than I do at this moment. Sometimes I think I'm the last person to know some of this. But if I need to address, if you ask for a larger courtroom and you articulate that reason, I will certainly entertain that.

MR. MOORE: Let me raise this motion at this time.

It's not on my list, I have provided it to the State and

I've provided a copy to the Court, which would be the

Motion for Change of Venue. Could we address that now?

I think the State has a copy.

THE COURT: Let me finish this motion, Number 19.

THE COURT: I'm going to grant with regard to a

Motion in Limine with Non-statutory Mitigating Factors.

I'm going to reserve ruling on the rest, and you can
bring those issues up in the event they become an issue.

Okay?

MR. MOORE: Sure.

MR. MOORE: I don't.

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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McMaster, I think he's given me. Oh, they're saying that they are in here.

Okay. I do have the Motion for Change of Venue. I apologize. It's Number 41.

MR. MOORE: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I have a copy of it, I can give this back to you. Wouldn't want you not to have a copy. I'm sure you have one somewhere.

Okay. It's Number 41.

MR. MOORE: May I proceed?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. MOORE: First of all, it doesn't comply with the Rule 3.240, which requires an affidavit by the movant, which would be Mr. Bradley, but also by two other individuals who would be leaders of the community, who can attest that because of the extensive media coverage, the Defendant in their opinion could not get a fair trial.

And I didn't supply those because although I've contacted numerous people who are both in the legal community and outside the legal community, who I believe could easily be described as leaders of the community and knowledgeable about the media coverage, they were not willing to provide affidavits.

And not because they didn't believe that there RYAN REPORTING

could be a problem with a fair trial because of the media coverage, but because they just didn't want an affidavit with their name on it in this case file.

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So, that's why I haven't been able to comply with it, the Rule, the technical requirements of the Rule. However, I'm making the Court aware we have something of that anybody who reads the newspaper or watches TV, could escape from being aware of, which is the extensive media coverage by this case, of this case.

And the fact that we have not been able to comply with a technical requirement of the Rule would not foreclose us from moving for a change of venue if we cannot because of the media coverage seat a fair and untainted jury in this jurisdiction.

So, merely to comply with the requirement that I filed the motion pretrial, which is what the Rule says, it's got to be filed pretrial, but the fact that I can't file it in the precise form that the Rule requires, through no fault of my own, should not be an impediment to the Court if we reach the point where we can't seat a jury, of considering moving the venue to another location where we can hopefully seat a jury that's not been tainted or affected by the media coverage.

So, I think what I'm saying here is, I want the Court to be aware of it, the motion's still on the RYAN REPORTING

table, but as even if we provided experts' testimony and all the affidavits, I do believe that with the State objecting, and the last time I talked to Mr. McMaster the State was objecting to changing the venue, that it would be appropriate. And probably the only way the Court could rule on that is if we tried to seat a jury, and then reached a point where we couldn't or decided we couldn't seat one because of the media coverage.

So, I'm asking the Court to be aware of the motion, aware of the potential problem -- I'm sure the Court already is -- and to reserve ruling on the motion, is all I'm asking at this time.

THE COURT: Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: I think that's an acceptable procedure, Judge, and perhaps later he'll be able to comply with the technical requirements of the Rule.

MR. MOORE: I don't expect that to change.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll note for the record that the affidavits have not been filed. I'll note the argument by the Defense, and I'll reserve ruling.

I think the other motion is Number 33.

MR. McMASTER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Motion to Sequester the Jury. Mr. Moore, you may proceed.

MR. MOORE: Well, it's related in the sense that in RYAN REPORTING

the past the case has generated much media coverage, and it will during the course of the trial. And my concern is because of the length of the trial, the potential exposure of jurors, even though they're instructed not to pay attention to media coverage, that they will be exposed to it and be affected by it unless they are sequestered.

I know that's a huge burden on the jurors, but however, if it turns out that the media coverage is what I expect it to be, and that's a reasonable assumption, and the potential being great for exposure to that media coverage, if that comes to fruition and the people sitting on the jury are exposed to media coverage and are affected by it in any way, then the entire trial is a waste of time.

And so, the only way to prevent that and from having to go through this trial a second time, would be to sequester the jury from the time they're seated.

THE COURT: Mr. Moore, my observation and the information that's been provided to me, is that the coverage with regard to this case has been local only.

MR. MOORE: It's been national.

THE COURT: I'm not aware of any national coverage,

I'm not aware of any request made to our Court

Administration by any national news organizations. Just

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so you know.

So, are you aware of any national news coverage?

MR. MOORE: Well, I am, because there was a -what's the word -- there was a recognition of fallen
officers in Washington, D.C., at which President Obama
spoke, and he listed about five officers who had lost
their lives in the line of duty, and listed Deputy
Barbara Pill as one of them. And it was televised
nationally and it got quite a bit of local coverage when
the local feeds picked up on it because of the ties with
the local community.

And so, there has been, on the basis of that, national coverage. And of course, as the Court is aware, there's been extensive statewide and an ever greater amount in Brevard county, on at least a weekly -

THE COURT: When you say statewide, other than the news that covers Brevard County, who also covers the adjoining counties --

MR. MOORE: Talking about Orlando, Orange County and whoever is within the broadcasting radius of Channel 9, Channel 13 and Channel 2 --

THE COURT: Okay. I just want to make sure --

MR. MOORE: -- which is Central Florida and beyond.

THE COURT: Okay. Central Florida coverage I would RYAN REPORTING

1 agree with.

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MR. MOORE: Right. And so, do I have precise dates and do I have affidavits from people from Pensacola or Tampa, even, who have heard and are aware of these things? I don't have that. But I think one can reasonably surmise that it is extended at least across Central Florida.

And so, anybody who is in this area and on a regular basis in the newspapers, at one point it was daily just about, weekly for some stretches of time, and regularly. And so, that coverage I expect will continue during the course of the trial. And the risk of jurors being exposed to that will continue during the course of the trial.

And despite the admonitions and instructions from the Court, if you're living in a world in which there is this flow of media coverage, which will pick up as we get closer to trial, then there is an increased, proportionately increased risk of exposure to the media coverage and potential risk of taint to the jury.

And so, that's my concern, and I think the only way to assure that that will not happen, is to sequester the jury in the course of the trial. Once they're seated, sequester them.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

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MR. BROWN: Judge, at this time, the State's position is we don't feel that's necessary.

The coverage in this case I would put as equivalent to other heavily-profiled cases that we've done in this county. Those have been successfully done without sequestering the jury.

Mr. Moore and I did a case, I think he was on it or maybe he got off it at the end, I don't recall, but triple homicide in Titusville, including the shooting of a five-year-old girl, and that was on the news everyday. The media covered every step of that trial. It was on every local broadcast. The jury was not sequestered during that trial nor in the penalty phase of it, and it was not a problem.

The Court gave the jury instructions daily. We addressed that issue on a daily basis. Told them what news broadcasts were here, to avoid it at all cost. And the jury followed the Court's order. And that same procedure's been done in a number of other cases that would have similar type of coverage that we have here.

People point to the Casey Anthony case. Obviously that trial and that case, I would submit to the Court, had a great deal more media attention than this case has had or any other case we've had in the county. And in fact, that case they went out -- the jury was picked I RYAN REPORTING

believe from St. Petersburg, brought to Orlando for the trial. They were sequestered there, but the only other option would have been having them drive back and forth from St. Pete to Orlando everyday. So, that would not have been feasible.

MR. MOORE: Which case was that?

MR. BROWN: Casey Anthony case.

So, Judge, our position in this case is we don't think it's necessary. It's entirely within the Court's discretion. There are times, obviously when they're deliberating that unless it's waived, the Court has to sequester them. But other than that, we don't feel it's necessary, but it is entirely within the Court's discretion.

MR. MOORE: And Judge, neither of those cases involve the death of a police officer. And the last case that I can recall high profile, and they all are involving deaths of police officers, is the William Cruse case in the early nineties. And that was moved to Bartow, Florida. That was moved to the other side of the state because of the publicity.

So, it's a different type of case, different breed of case. It has a different reaction from the community that's aware of a case when there is an officer who has died.

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And so, that's what we're dealing with here. So, the only other precedent that I can recall involving a similar set of facts from nearly 20 years ago, was moved. And I don't know whether they were sequestered or not, but I'm asking that we either be moved and sequestered, and that step was taken in the last case that I know of involving William Cruse, as the Defendant.

So, there is a precedent for it, and my concern is that we don't have to try the case a second time. There are steps we can take to increase the likelihood that we will not have to do that. And one of those is sequestering the jury.

THE COURT: Okay. At this time I'm going to deny the motion. I am going to deny it without prejudice. Depending on what happens during the jury selection process, I'm concerned about what information may come out during the jury selection process as to whether this motion needs to be readdressed. But I am denying it without prejudice.

Okay. We have a few more moments. We can address a few more. I do have -- we're going to conclude at 5:30. Do you want to address more or do you want to stop at this time and do the rest on the 21st?

MR. MOORE: Let me see where we are after the next, RYAN REPORTING

1 which would be Number 20.

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THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MOORE: And if time permitting, we'll move on.

So, Number 20 would be Motion for Disclosure of

Impeaching Information. This is a Brady request, and

it's sort of related to an earlier motion but with more
specificity.

What I'm getting at is, there are numerous witnesses on the list provided by the State who would not be -- I mean, euphemistically described as non-law-abiding citizens, who are in and out of trouble, and I can't keep track, not as well as the State can, of the problems that they've gotten into and the potential for fair resolutions or favorable resolutions for their cooperation in this case.

I can think of about half a dozen right offhand. And what I'm asking is, if the State knows of situations where -- and again, this is within the knowledge and control, even if it's (Inaudible - sneezing in mic) of the State, of discussions that are had with these individuals who are on the State's witness list, who will be testifying in this case, that they will be considered for some favorable consideration in their respective cases, their legal cases.

So, that's what I'm addressing in this motion. And RYAN REPORTING

I'm thinking from a Prosecutor's standpoint, you know, I can't think like one because I've never been one, but they are focusing on other things than that.

But I just want to expand their awareness, if they have awareness, of any situations like the ones I've described where these individuals who are going to be testifying have gotten -- at least it's been implied to them that -- and more specifically, if they've been offered any type of favorable resolution in their cases for their testimony, that we need to know about that.

And I'm asking the Court to grant the motion, enter an Order that if the State has that knowledge, that they provide it to us.

THE COURT: Your motion's kind of directed towards other things, but what you're really requesting is that specific information.

MR. MOORE: Well, I think that's pretty much what I'm asking for.

THE COURT: I don't know where that beep's coming from, but it needs to stop.

MR. MOORE: In my first paragraph, the substance of any statements, agreements, offers and discussions had with witnesses or suggestions of lenience, compensation, assurance not to prosecute, assurance to proceed only on certain causes. So, that's sort of another way of RYAN REPORTING

stating what I'm asking.

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THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

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MR. McMASTER: With respect to Paragraph Number 1,

with respect to witnesses that will be testifying at trial, the State has no objection. If there are any agreements, we will be turning those over to the Defense.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I'll grant the motion, and will make the Order specific as to Paragraph Number 1.

MR. McMASTER: Paragraph Number 2 is partially restating Paragraph Number 1, and goes on to any types of consideration. I think that's a bit over-broad there.

They're talking about assistance or favorable treatment with respect to any criminal, civil, tax court or administrative dispute with Plaintiff. Not quite sure what they mean there. And anything else which could arguably create an interest or bias in the witness in favor of the State or against the Defense or act as an inducement to testify or to color testimony.

Judge, the State's aware of its obligations under Brady and Oggers (Phonetic) and Nafu (Phonetic) and the other cases. If we have any information regarding witnesses who are going to testify, we will in fact turn that information over.

RYAN REPORTING

I think a number of the things that they're asking for go far beyond what we have the ability to know about. In particular, Number 6, they're asking for any and all personal files. I assume they mean personnel files. I don't believe that's something that is obligated by the State to turn over for its witnesses. They have as much access to witness personnel files as we do.

And records regarding prior misconduct or bad acts committed by the witnesses. If it's in our possession and we have records relating to something that would qualify as impeachment material, we'll certainly turn it over.

With respect to felony convictions attributed to the witness, if the witness is going to testify, we will be checking for criminal histories. We will provide counsel with the criminal history information with respect to convictions and any pending prosecutions that the State's aware of.

So, within the guidelines delineated in the State of Florida and United States Supreme Court about the requirement for the State to disclose this type of information, we're certainly willing to comply.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Moore, my intention is to grant it with regard to any Brady material, and also RYAN REPORTING

with regard to specifically Paragraph Number 1 and Paragraph Number 4.

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I think that will cover that. Do you wish to be heard?

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knows. That's what I'm asking for. I'm not asking for them to go out and do our leg work. But they know of some consideration that some witness has gotten

MR. MOORE: Well, whatever the State has and what it

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somewhere in any way related to his testimony, then that

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-- they know it, and at least they have the knowledge,

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then they need to make us aware of that. And I think

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Mr. McMaster just said he would comply with that.

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So, if the Court wants to put it in terms of Brady evidence, then that would be sufficient, I believe.

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THE COURT: Okay. I'll make it with regard to Brady

Okav. It looks like it's almost 5:30. It is 5:30

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material and with regard to 1 and 4.

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on my watch. So, 21 and the rest we'll hear at 3:00

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o'clock on the 21st. Excluding we've already addressed,

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on my list, Number 41 and Number 43. And then, Mr.

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McMaster, yours was Number 47, 48, 49 and 50. So, we'll

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address those then, and then we'll see what we need to

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MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

address further from there.

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THE COURT: Okay. So, court will be in recess until RYAN REPORTING

	Page 92
1	the 21st at 3:00 p.m.
2	Thank you.
3	* * * *
4	(The audio proceedings were concluded at 5:31 p.m.)
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COUNTY OF BREVARD)

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DATED this 4th day of June, 2014.

Sheryl J. Dixon Transcriptionist

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