IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 05-2012-CF-035337-AXXX-XX

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORIGINAL

BRANDON BRADLEY,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF DIGITALLY RECORDED MOTIONS HEARING

The transcript of the Digitally Recorded Motion Hearing held in the above-styled cause at the Moore Justice Center, 2825 Judge Fran Jamieson Way, Viera, Florida, on the 21st day of January, 2014, commencing at 3:16 p.m., before the Honorable Morgan Reinman.

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## APPEARANCES

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Appearing for the Plaintiff

RANDALL MOORE, ESQUIRE
MICHAEL PIRROLO, ESQUIRE
MARK LANNING, ESQUIRE
Assistant Public Defenders
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Appearing for the Defendant

Brandon Bradley, Defendant, present

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: We can go on the record in the case of the State of Florida versus Brandon Lee Bradley. This is case number 12-CF-35337.

I did issue an Order from last week's -- from the motions that were heard on January 16, 2014. I assume everyone's received a copy of that order; is that correct?

MR. MOORE: I did.

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MR. McMASTER: That's correct, Judge.

MR. MOORE: We did.

THE COURT: The only other thing I wanted to point out from the prior Order that I entered, that I did add a date, and I wanted to make sure everyone knew that date. I added a date of non-death-penalty motions to be heard on February 20th, 2014, at 3:00 p.m. So, I added that date, so I wanted to make sure everyone was aware of that date.

Also, I will do a pretrial conference at that date, as well. My pretrial conferences probably be 15 to 30 minutes.

MR. MOORE: There will be a calendar call tomorrow?

THE COURT: There is a calendar call tomorrow, but I would assume he's not on that. I'm not sure.

MR. MOORE: Well, I had that for him, but then since RYAN REPORTING

we -- that was before the trial got moved, so I assume we would not have one for Mr. Bradley tomorrow.

THE COURT: I did cancel it when the trial got moved. With all due respect, we don't have to do a calendar call on him. So, he doesn't have to come to the one on -- I mean, this is set for February the 24th, and there's a calendar call before that. He doesn't need to be calendared for that calendar call and we don't need to have that calendar call. That's only to make sure what cases are going and what cases aren't and what week they want, and we know all that information with regard to Mr. Bradley, so we don't need to do a calendar call.

Okay. I just wanted to clarify that and make sure everybody was aware of that.

Unless you all want to proceed another way, it looks like we're on Number 21.

MR. MOORE: Right. Before we do that, Ms. Kerchner is going to enter a plea on January 23rd, as I understand it, at 3:00 p.m. --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MOORE: -- Thursday. And I asked the Court to enter an Order to hold her here so that as soon as that's done, we can take her deposition. And I've already cleared it with her lawyer, and there's no RYAN REPORTING

impediment from his point of view. So, I'd ask the

Court to enter an Order that instead of being rushed

back to Orange County jail, which as I understand where

she is now, she be kept here until we finish her depo.

THE COURT: That she'll be kept here in Brevard County?

MR. MOORE: Well, here at the courthouse so we can take her deposition. Otherwise we've got to go over there to do it. I've lined up a court reporter and --

THE COURT: Do you know the date for that?

MR. MOORE: The 23rd, January.

THE COURT: So, it is right after she takes her plea?

MR. MOORE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to say, I don't know what the issues are, but I know there was something with regard to the Brevard County jail. So, that will be fine. Once she enters the plea, I'll order that she remain until her deposition can be taken on that date. Okay?

MR. MOORE: Thank you. Do you want me to submit an Order? I can do that.

THE COURT: No, I can remember. Mr. McMaster won't let me forget. And I'm writing it down.

MR. MOORE: I'm not implying anything, Judge.

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THE COURT: If I write it down normally we're good to go. If I don't write it down you might not be good to go.

Okay. Hold on just a minute.

MR. MOORE: Sure.

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THE COURT: Okay. Are we ready to go with Number 21?

MR. MOORE: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.

MR. MOORE: Number 21, Motion for Individual
Sequestered Voir Dire. What I'm asking, Your Honor, is
that after the preliminary questioning where the jurors
are asked about scheduling conflicts and those sorts of
things, their qualifications to sit on the jury, and
then after those people are removed, then before we get
into the general voir dire, that we do individual
sequestered voir dire on the issues of death penalty and
media exposure.

And what I'm asking specifically is that both that we do individuals on all of the death-penalty questioning individually and all of the media questioning individually, whether they raise their hands or not.

And as I see it, if it's tagged on, if the media questioning is tagged on to the death questioning, then RYAN REPORTING

there's no down side to doing it that way because
they'll say -- I think they'll be more forthcoming if we
can do it that way. But if they say, no, we haven't
read anything about it, which I can't imagine that
anybody who's lived in Brevard County for the last year
and a half and who is capable of reading, has not, if
they say no, then we move on. We don't spend anymore
time on it than we would in here.

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And as to the death qualification, Your Honor, there is a precedent for, as the Court knows, Judge Griesbaum in the Warren case did it about two years ago, and he's going to be doing it in the Peak case in May. And Judge Crawford is going to be doing individual sequestered voir dire on death penalty and media exposure on the Anthony Welch case, which I don't know that that's been set, but he's indicated he would do that.

The reason for it is based on a California Supreme Court case, Hovey, H O V E Y, which I cited in my motion. And in that case it was introduced into evidence where several, probably 70 or 80, research papers that determined the effect of death-qualifying juries in death-penalty cases. And two conclusions were reached.

One, that jurors who go through that process are

more inclined to convict. And number two, they're more prone to impose a death sentence.

And on the basis of that, the California Court entered an Order that not as a matter of constitutional law, but as a matter of procedure, that the California Criminal Procedure would adopt an individual sequestered voir dire on those matters in death-penalty cases.

That subsequently was voted down by the voters of California, but it's still discretionary there. And in Florida it's discretionary with the Court.

It will not add any more time, it will not unduly or significantly expand the time that we spend or the energy that we spend on this trial. I've done it and other judges have done it, and they are willing to do it again, those who've done it.

And frankly, Judge, we are at -- haven't even reached the two-year mark of the age of this case, which is unusual for a case of this complexity. It's complex from our side, from the Defense side. It's challenging from our side.

And I have in my goal of trying this case before I leave the employ of the Public Defender's Office, I have taken a hard long look at what we need to do in this case, not necessarily what we could do, what's possible, what can be done. If all we did, if we expanded our RYAN REPORTING

efforts to include what could be done, what we can do, we could justify another year-and-a-half working on this case.

And I'm talking about getting ready for trial without compromising our competence, our trial preparation, without cutting any corners, which will make us less able to defend our client.

And so, we're not cutting any corners, but I am focusing on what we need to do to be ready for trial. We have moved up a time line on this case significantly, probably a year or year-and-a-half before it would otherwise be ready. And so, if the Court's concerned, if the State expresses a concern that individual sequestered voir dire might add a few days, two or three days, which I doubt, then in the big picture, it's not a valid argument.

So, if we know from the empirical research in this case, which is accepted by the Supreme Court of California, that such a voir dire procedure is done individually and sequestered produces a more fair jury, a jury that's more apt to reach a verdict and a sentencing recommendation if we get to that, based upon the evidence and the law and not on extraneous things like the actual group jury selection process, which is more likely to produce a conviction-prone jury, then why

not employ that.

And so, I'm asking the Court to permit us in a sequestered fashion to question individual jury members on their feelings about the death penalty and on media exposure.

And I might want also add a question, something to the effect that, is there any reason you can think of why you cannot sit and be fair and impartial in this trial.

Judge, I wouldn't expect that to lead to extensive discussion, but it might produce answers that we don't want a group to hear.

And so, that's what I'm proposing, that's what I'm requesting.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: As Mr. Moore indicated, it is discretionary with the Court.

It would be the State's position that with respect to the media coverage and individuals' knowledge about the media coverage, that would probably be best done individually and sequestered one at a time, so as not to expose the jurors who have not heard or been exposed to the media coverage to what the other jurors have been.

With respect to the death-penalty qualification, I believe it's a bit premature to agree to an individual

and sequestered voir dire of them regarding the death penalty.

The cases that I've been involved in have been done with the jurors as a whole. I thought it went very smoothly in that way because to do it individually you're going to end up repeating the same questions to each individual juror over and over again. Whereas, if you're doing it to the group, only those who would be affected by a particular answer would be responding. And their answers when given can open up the discussion with the other jurors about their feelings. I think it's more inclined to get the jurors talking about, be it the death penalty than the other way around.

So, having said that, once again, it is discretionary with the Court.

As for the time line of pushing this case where they could justify another year-and-a-half so of investigations, that was precisely the State's concern when we discussed this last week at the motion hearings, and discussed our concerns about the Defense wished to go forward as speedy as they did.

And I don't know that you can take time off of one side of that and try to add it on to the other to justify doing individual voir dire. They need time to prepare, they need time to prepare.

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MR. MOORE: I'm not asking for time to prepare. I'm saying, I have focused exclusively on this case because of the other 16 or so cases that we have, half of which are death-penalty cases, those have been absorbed by the other members of the capital division, so I've had the luxury of being able to focus exclusively on this case.

I haven't cut any corners. I don't want to compromise my client's right to a fair trial and the best legal representation we can provide. That's been my goal for the last 30 years. I'm not about to cut any corners.

But however, I do want to see this case tried before I leave, without compromising my client or his right to a fair trial.

My concern with the jury selection process in a group is that having tried several of those, there is a tendency for people to adopt answers that are given by other members of the group, and not to respond, because it's easier to do that, frankly, than to admit that they may not be fair or they may be biased in some way. seen it.

And so, I feel that the jurors or venire persons are more comfortable in a less social setting where it's more relaxed, for one thing, and they're not exposed to continual repeated questioning of the entire venire, RYAN REPORTING

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And so, I only bring that up not to say that I'm speeding into this and I'm cutting corners and damn the RYAN REPORTING

which according to surveys that were adopted in the Hovey case, it tends to infer and imply to the other venire members that because the experts in the court, the defense attorneys, the judge, the prosecutors, who the jurors tend to look up to, since they're spending so much time talking about death penalty, that they must somehow believe that the Defendant is guilty. And that was demonstrated in the academic surveys that were the under pending of the Hovey case.

And the conclusion was, for all of those reasons, that the best way to arrive at a jury that's not affected by those factors, is to do individual sequestered voir dire.

And if that is a way, which it's been empirically demonstrated, why not do it. If we all know that that is the effect of doing the jury selection that way. I mean, that's what these academics, the conclusion they drew. And they're not associated with anybody; nobody hired them to do that. It wasn't like they were preparing these research papers for litigation. They just did the research, and it was adopted by the attorneys in making their argument, which persuaded the California Supreme Court.

torpedoes, I'm saying we've done all that we necessarily have to do, I believe, and can be ready and be competent and effective, hopefully, through our preparation, which I believe has been thorough, to begin this case on February the 24th. And for that reason, because we have spent less time in the big picture preparing this, that an argument that time is a factor, should not be a factor that's going to unnecessarily prolong this case, because it won't.

I mean, the attorneys that I've talked to and the judges that have done it this way, have found that it works, and it does not unduly prolong the case.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, in the Patrick Warren case, we picked a death-qualified jury individually in a little over four days.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMASTER: We actually picked the jury in less than a week.

MR. MOORE: There's another aspect of it, and that is the fact of a death of a police officer is recognized as being a different breed of homicide. And it is the subject of an aggravating circumstance.

And with the intense publicity that this case has generated and that factor of the case being carved out and specifically recognized as holding it in a different RYAN REPORTING

category of homicide than other homicides because of that fact, I mean, it would require a delicate handling of these issues, which could best be done in private with these individuals. And we are more likely to get at their true feelings about these matters if we can do it in the fashion that I'm requesting.

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I don't mean to be blunt, but this isn't your garden-variety case. There are many factors about it which set it apart, and it needs to be handled in an unusually sensitive manner, in my view, and the best way to do that is through the individual sequestered voir dire.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court will deny as it pertains to the discussion of the death penalty with the entire panel. I will grant as to individual voir dire of the potential jurors as to the prior knowledge of the case. But I will add at that time a general question as to any other reason why you feel that you can't serve.

I have a general question that I normally ask at the end of voir dire. I will ask that at that time. I will ask that kind of open-ended, all-inclusive reason why. I'll ask that as to the individual voir dire when I ask about prior knowledge of the case. And that would happen at the end, because they'd already have the benefit of the other discussion.

eneilt of the other discussion. RYAN REPORTING

Okay. Number 22. MR. MOORE: Motion in Limine and to Strike Portions 2 of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 3 4 5 MR. McMASTER: That's 23. 6 7 MR. MOORE: That's 23. THE COURT: I have that as 22. 8 9 Number 19, which we did last week. in this. And what I'm getting at is --

Cases, citing Caldwell versus Mississippi. THE COURT: 22. I enumerated Mitigating Factors. MR. McMASTER: So do I. I believe it's a repeat of 10 MR. MOORE: Well, 23 and 28 and 19 should be 11 considered together, but there's some additional factors 12 13 14 THE COURT: Are we all on the same thing? 15 16 MR. MOORE: Well --MR. McMASTER: I'm hoping. 17 MR. MOORE: Does the Court have a copy of the motion 18 that I'm referring to; the one that says, read Caldwell 19 versus Mississippi at the bottom, bottom line? 20 MR. McMASTER: That's 23. 21 THE COURT: That's Number 23. 22

23 MR. MOORE: Right.

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THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MOORE: Okay. So, the previous ones were RYAN REPORTING

1 attacking the constitutionality.

THE COURT: Thought the previous one was a motion in reference to non-enumerated mitigating factors, and I think Mr. --

MR. MOORE: No.

THE COURT: -- Mr. McMaster already agreed to that.

MR. MOORE: No, he -- well, no, he didn't agree to that.

MR. McMASTER: It's on 22.

MR. MOORE: We did this last week.

MR. McMASTER: No, it was Number 19, Motion in Limine Regarding the Procedures. You had it -- the first one was the catchall provision that you didn't want us referring to.

MR. MOORE: I remember arguing that, but --

MR. McMASTER: Because it was part of your Number 19 motion, the Motion in Limine in Re: Procedures.

And to make things easy on Number 22, Judge, I believe Mr. Brown stated our position last week, that we do not refer to any of the mitigating circumstances as either statutory or non-statutory. They just would be referred to in front of the jury as mitigating circumstances.

THE COURT: If Mr. Moore will accept that, that would be -- I would grant that.

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MR. MOORE: Yeah, I think we're talking about
different motions, though. Because we may have revised
this list.

But the motion, the subject of this motion that I'm

But the motion, the subject of this motion that I'm doing now, we have not done, and we're asking --

THE COURT: Which one are you doing; the Number 22 or Number 23?

MR. MOORE: All right. 22 is a Motion in Limine Regarding Reference to Non-Enumerated Mitigating Factors.

Okay. Maybe I flipped that over too fast. I did.

12 THE COURT: I think that it talks about in your 13 motion --

MR. MOORE: Right, right, right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: Just no reference to mitigating factors as being a catchall or non-statutory. We don't normally run into that, but I don't want to take any chances, and I want a ruling on that. That nobody will refer to it; State Attorneys won't, Judge won't refer to non-statutory mitigating circumstances as either catchall or non-statutory.

THE COURT: Mr. McMaster.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, as far as the State goes, we don't have any objection to that motion. I believe Mr. RYAN REPORTING

Brown indicated that last week as part of the Number 19 motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Then Motion Number 22 will be granted.

MR. MOORE: All right. Now, 23.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MOORE: Motion in Limine to Strike Portions of Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Re: Caldwell versus Mississippi. And there are specific aspects of it, of the standard instruction, which I'm asking the Court to strike and revise.

And specifically, they would be the use of the words "advisory" recommendation that the jury is advising, because it diminishes he responsibility of the jurors under Caldwell. And I will submit a proposed instruction during the charging conference which reflects those requested changes, which substitute the word -- well, will take those words out, "advisory" and "advise", and will -- the proposed instruction which I don't have now, will address that.

Asking that the instruction be revised so that the jury's instructed that aggravating circumstances would have to weigh mitigating circumstances, which is -- the standard instruction has the jury finding mitigating circumstances outweighing aggravating circumstances,

puts a burden on the Defense, and it should be on the State, which is a due process violation.

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Also, although the instruction says that the recommendation of the jury as to sentence must be given great weight, in deference by the Court, the jury's not also told that the Court can deviate from the jury's determination only if wholly unreasonable. And that's Mills versus Moore at 786 So.2d 532.

So, we'd ask -- and Courts are permitted to make changes in a standard instruction to reflect the case law. And if that's the case law, then it would be discretionary with this Court and appropriate for the Court to adopt that language in Mills versus Moore, that the recommendation by the jury can be disregarded only if wholly unreasonable.

So, we'd ask that the Court make those changes in the instructions, and I'm objecting to the standard instructions which misstate in terms of what the law provides, those portions that I have just made reference to, and I will submit a proposed instruction to the Court at the appropriate time, which will be during the charging conference, for the Court to rule on.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, as we indicated last week, the recent case of Foster versus State, the Supreme Court of RYAN REPORTING

Florida opinion dated October 17th of 2013, on Page 27 of the printed opinion, the quote is "The standard penalty phase jury instructions fully advise the jury of the importance of its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role of the jury and do not violate Caldwell versus Mississippi."

I'd suggest that Number 23 be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 23 is denied.

MR. MOORE: Motion Number 24, Motion for Interrogatory Penalty Phase Verdict.

And of course, we discussed Steele last week, which says that a special interrogatory verdict at the penalty phase would be inappropriate. But however, I would ask the Court to take into consideration Justice Parenti's concurring opinion in the case that I've cited, Aguirre-Jarquin, that's A G U I R R E, hyphen, J A R Q U I N, versus State, Florida Supreme Court case from 2009, found at 9 So.3rd 953, and specifically at -- well, it's Justice Parenti's concurring opinion.

And the issue is whether a Trial Court should be permitted to give a special interrogatory verdict to a jury at the penalty phase where the jury's asked to give the number of votes for each aggravating circumstance for and against, and do the same with mitigating circumstances. And her reasoning is this, and let me RYAN REPORTING

quote it, it's brief.

Justice Parenti says, "I agree with the majority's affirmance of the convictions and sentence of death. I write to address the difficulties created by our failure to allow or mandate special interrogatories in death penalty cases, as more fully explained in my separate opinions in," and she gives cites for other previous cases where she has cited this opinion.

And reiterated in LeBron, which is one of those cases, "The use of special verdict forms would enable this Court to tell when a jury has unanimously found a death-qualifying aggravating circumstance, which would both facilitate our proportionality review and satisfy the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury even where the recommendation of death is less than unanimous."

So, it guides the Trial Court in doing that and allowing the jury to say exactly what they found, because we have 15 aggravating circumstances, and I could guess at some of but of course not all of the aggravating circumstances in this case. But it's conceivable that a few jurors could find some and a few others could find others, and it could hardly be said that the finding of the aggravating circumstances in any penalty phase case are beyond a reasonable doubt because of the structure. There is no way to review that.

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There is no guidance given to the Court as to how much weight to give to a jury's recommendation other than great weight.

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On the other hand, if the Court could see what precise aggravating circumstances were found and how many of the jurors found them. And similarly, the same analysis applied to mitigating circumstances; exactly which mitigating circumstances were found and by what vote, the Trial Court would be guided in helping the Court to arrive at the ultimate sentence. And the Appellate Court will be guided, as well, in proportionality review.

And so, Justice Parenti, which goes against the majority in the Aguirre-Jarquin case that I just cited; however, it's a concurring opinion, and the opinion underscores the problem with our current death penalty scheme and the way that it's employed, the way it's reviewed.

So, I have given some examples of specific interrogatories that I'm asking the Court to give the jury to allow them to tell precisely which aggravating circumstances they found and by what vote.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, in addition to the Steele case that Mr. Moore has acknowledged, the State would ask the RYAN REPORTING

1 Court to take a look at Supreme Court of Florida 3

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decisions in Coday versus State, that's C O D A Y,

that's at 946 So.2d 988. And the Supreme Court of Florida decision in Hernandez versus State, that's at 4

So.3rd 642, a 2009 decision.

And I have copies for the Court and counsel. May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McMASTER: In the Coday decision at Page 15, the printed number page of the opinion, the Florida Supreme Court noted in the first full paragraph, "We specifically held that it is a departure from the essential requirements of the law to use a special verdict form detailing the jury's determination on the aggravating circumstances."

In the Hernandez opinion, at Page 19, they held that similarly, "We have also rejected Hernandez's alternative argument that a special verdict form indicating the aggravating factors found by the jury should have been used."

It is perhaps a circumstance that Judge Parenti might find compelling, however the Florida Supreme Court has clearly ruled against it and has held that it is a deviation from Florida law to do that, so we would suggest that that be denied.

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THE COURT: Motion Number 24 is denied.

MR. MOORE: Motion 25, Motion in Limine Regarding Grand Jury. And very simply, I'm asking that the charging document, which is an indictment in this case as is required by the constitution, that it be referred to as a charging document and not by the Grand Jury. And that there be no reference to the fact that the charging document was arrived at through the Grand Jury process.

There is no reason for that terminology other than to inform the jury that another body has convened and passed on the evidence and arrived at a decision that this case should be charged.

That's confusing to juries. I've seen it in the past. I actually recall one, during voir dire, former foreman of a grand jury who claimed that her grand jury indicted the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. And then trying to scramble to undo that damage.

So, there is no benefit to be gained by referring to the indictment as an indictment. It's a can of worms to be avoided and the opening of that by just referring to it as a charging document, which is my request. That's the basis of my motion, that no party refer to the charging document other than as just that.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

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MR. McMASTER: Judge, the fact of the matter is that the charges were in fact returned by a Grand Jury and the document is entitled an Indictment. I mean, to ignore that is to ignore reality.

Having said that, it's the Court's discretion as to what you want us to refer to the document as.

MR. MOORE: There's no downside to it, Judge, as I see it. There's only the possible benefit of avoiding jury confusion about what that exactly means and what the standard of proof is for a Grand Jury.

I mean, I suppose the State's response could be, well, let's get into it, let's just tell them it's probable cause and that's less than beyond a reasonable doubt. But I think that just further causes confusion on the part of the jury. Why even go there when we can avoid it all?

THE COURT: Mr. Moore, do you have the indictment handy?

MR. MOORE: I do not.

THE COURT: I may have it in here, I'm not sure.

I'm just going to see what it looks like.

Can the clerks by chance, can you look back at the actions filed and see if you can tell me where the indictment is?

I think I just found it. Is it Document Number 43?

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MR. McMASTER: Do you want a copy of it, Judge? I can have it printed if you want.

THE COURT: Actually, if you'll print it so I can just have it.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

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THE COURT: Actually, she's going to print it. She's got it.

I'm going to grant the motion. It's not to be ——
I'm going to grant it in that cannot refer to an
indictment being returned by a Grand Jury. I have no
problem with referring to it as the charging document
instead of indictment. So, the Motion Number 25 is
granted.

So, Mr. McMaster, you've got to make sure you advise the witnesses accordingly.

Okay. Number 26.

MR. MOORE: 26 is a Motion in Limine Re:

Photographs, and I think I would ask the Court to pass
on hearing that until we actually arrive at that portion
of the trial where we're dealing with photographs.

Because unless the Court can see and we can all see, then we can't really make sense out of this. Best be argued later.

THE COURT: The Court will reserve on this motion until the time of trial.

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Okay. Number 27.

MR. MOORE: Is a Motion for Disclosure of Penalty-Phase Evidence. Last week the Court heard and granted our motion requiring the State to identify its penalty-phase witnesses, as distinct from just the guilt-phase witnesses. And that being the case, we're asking the Court to also direct the State to disclose the evidence that it intends to introduce through those witnesses.

We have reams of disclosure and discovery in this case, but in trying to sort out what is going to be introduced at the penalty phase from a Defense standpoint, I mean the State already knows, we shouldn't be made to guess and should if we are able to get at least some advance notice about who the witnesses are, what evidence they're going to be providing.

If all the State can do is statements previously provided through this witness and a place where we can go and see where those statements are, that would I think be sufficient. But they'll need to give it to us twice, but it's just not giving it to us a second time by itself, it's also identifying as the penalty-phase evidence.

So, I'm asking that the State in addition to having to identify the witnesses it intends to call at the penalty phase, the evidence that the State proposes to

offer through those witnesses.

THE COURT: Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: They're not asking for disclosure of penalty-phase evidence. They're asking for essentially a detailed bill of particulars as to specifically which items of evidence we intend to use during the penalty phase.

First, let me make it clear that all of this evidence has in fact been disclosed to the Defense. If you look at their motion, they basically track Rule 3.220 Discovery Requirements the State has in producing all of its evidence, whether for the guilt phase or the penalty phase, which has been done.

Now he's asking us not only to detail the particular aggravators, which the Court has ordered us to do and we will comply with in writing, although I did it verbally last week, they know what evidence that they have received from the State in connection with this case would apply to those particular aggravators.

It is an additional imposition on the State that is not required by law, it's not justified under these facts and circumstances, and we would oppose it.

MR. MOORE: Judge, it's like handing us a phone book and saying, here, your witnesses are in here, find them.

I mean, we have a witness list with nearly 200 names on RYAN REPORTING

it. We have hundreds of reports. And trying to figure out, beyond guessing, what's going to appear at the penalty phase, puts us at a disadvantage that we shouldn't have in this case involving the death penalty.

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I don't care what terminology we use to refer to what the State has to do, whether it's a bill of particulars, I'm just saying we want the State to have to provide to us specifically what evidence they're going to be introducing to these witnesses. What statements, what exhibits, what type of demonstrable evidence. Whatever it is they intend to introduce through these witnesses, we're asking for that.

If they've already provided it and they can show us where they provided it and that it will be and can be identified as penalty phase evidence, then that's what we're looking for. Not just a 200-witness list and hundreds of police reports, and leaving us to try to figure out what's going to appear at the penalty phase.

So, we shouldn't have to do that. If the State knows what it's going to do, then the State should be required to tell us what it's going to do. It's not a tactical matter. I mean, if they're disclosing who the witnesses are, what evidence is going to come through those witnesses? That's what we're asking for. Whether you call it a bill of particulars or anything else, it RYAN REPORTING

doesn't matter, but that's in substance what we're asking for.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to deny this motion. I thought I was pretty generous last week in my other rulings, and you have that evidence and I think that would not be appropriate.

So, I'm going to deny the request with regard to Motion Number 27.

Number 28.

MR. MOORE: Judge, I'm going to ask the Court to hear this at the instruction conference, the charging conference. I've already addressed a number of the issues, a number of objections that I have, but I would ask the Court to defer hearing this until we actually talked about jury instructions.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll reserve it --

MR. McMASTER: Judge, the State would just ask you to outright deny it. I mean, it's clear from the Foster quote that I read earlier and talked about last week, that the Florida Supreme Court as late as October 13th of 2013, has approved the specific death penalty standard jury instructions that are available for use in this case.

If he's got additional changes that he wants to make, he can certainly submit those proffered

instructions at the jury instruction conference and the Court can rule on those individually. But to do it at this point, I think it's clear that the standard ones are acceptable, certainly to the Florida Supreme Court.

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MR. MOORE: I'm asking the Court to reserve on this until we're actually looking at the proposed instructions and talking about them.

THE COURT: But Mr. Moore, how does this motion -- how is it different from Motion Number 23?

MR. MOORE: Well, it essentially states the same, it's just it gives a case law background in the attached memorandum. And I think it would be best to deal with the specific instructions when we have the instructions in black and white, and then we can point to exactly what it is, instead of leafing through this motion, which is voluminous, and trying to deal with it that way.

I mean, it's better to deal with it when you've got actually what you're objecting to in front of you, and making the objections and getting rulings based upon what the Court proposes to do. We're not there yet.

I mean, we've got some questions of what the aggravating circumstances are going to be and what the mitigating circumstances are going to be that are read to the jury, and I think it would be more appropriate to RYAN REPORTING

deal with it at that time.

THE COURT: Okay. The way the motion is framed, I'm going to deny the motion. I mean, obviously at the time of the charging document with regard to specific objections, I'll allow you to make your arguments as you deem appropriate at that time.

Okay. Number 29.

MR. MOORE: 29 is Motion for Additional Peremptory
Challenges Due to Numerical Disparity Regarding
Peremptory Challenges Provided by Rule 3.350(a) Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 913.08 Florida
Statutes and Due to Sensitive Voir Dire Issues in this
Case.

There is a disproportionate jury -- well, there's a disadvantage in death-penalty cases in exercising peremptory challenges, in that, to illustrate, when a non-life-or-death felony is tried, it would be tried by a six-person jury. There are six peremptory challenges available to both sides. That is one challenge per seat on the jury.

If it's a felony that's punishable by life, but a non-death case, there are ten challenges for a six-person jury. So, that would be one-and-two-thirds strike per seat on the jury.

In a death penalty case, there are ten challenges RYAN REPORTING

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for 12 seats on the jury, so that's less than one challenge per chair, one challenge per seat on the jury.

So, a Defendant in a case where it's usually infinitely, significantly more complex, where the stakes are definitely higher, where the death penalty's being sought, and especially in a case where there are many other issues; law enforcement involvement and high publicity, that the disproportionate challenging potential that a Defendant has in a death-penalty case, would justify the Court giving more peremptory challenges than just the ten that we're allotted.

So, and of course, both sides get an equal number of extras. But because of the charge, because of the other factors of the victim being a law enforcement officer and the extensive media coverage, we would ask the Court to grant an additional number of peremptories to both sides in dealing with these issues, because I frankly don't think ten will be enough, even with the for-cause challenges, I don't think that -- I think that we're at a disadvantage on the Defense side by not having more than the allotted ten peremptories that we're being given.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Well, Judge, I'm sure the Florida Supreme Court had all that information before it when it RYAN REPORTING

fashioned the Rule in the first place. I think we should approach this as we do any other trial with respect to the need for additional peremptory challenges. Go with what the Rule allows first, and if more are needed, we raise it and argue it at that point and the Court can provide additional peremptories if necessary.

MR. MOORE: Judge, I don't see this as being just like any other trial. I mean, for many reasons it's not. It's in a category by itself. And for the reasons that I've mentioned, I don't need to repeat.

And so, for an exceptional case, then exception should be made, I think. But both sides are equally advantage. Neither side is disadvantaged by what I'm proposing.

THE COURT: Anything else from the State?

MR. McMASTER: Just briefly, Judge. I mean, the Florida Supreme Court is as fond of saying death is different. Had they decided that it requires additional peremptory challenges, they certainly could have provided for them and they did not.

So, it's the State's position we go with what the Rule says, and if we need them as they come up, the Court can deal with it at that point.

MR. MOORE: That's our position, it's discretionary RYAN REPORTING

with the Court. The Court can take stock of the case
before it and not just put it in this lump category of
it's just like all the other cases, because it isn't,
and acknowledge that and give both sides equal
peremptory -- number of peremptory challenges to deal
with this unique case.

THE COURT: Okay. The Defense's Motion Number 29 is denied.

Mr. Moore, if you feel that you need, based on specific circumstances that come up during the jury selection, we can readdress them.

Okay. Number 30.

MR. MOORE: Number 30, our circumstances have changed with respect to. Let me read it. Motion for Juror Questionnaire to Supplement Voir Dire and Proposed Sample Questionnaire. So, for that reason, we will withdraw that motion at this time.

THE COURT: So, Number 30 is withdrawn by the Defense.

MR. MOORE: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Number 31.

MR. MOORE: 31 is a Motion for List of Prospective Jurors, which I believe the Court has already stated we will be getting about two weeks before trial. Would that be about right?

RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: I think Mr. Pirrolo requested a certain date. I conferred with the jury clerk and that date was acceptable. And the attorneys shall receive the jury 3 4 venire list by February 18, 2014.

So, I think that motion would be moot at this time. Or I could --

MR. MOORE: Is there an earlier date? I mean, is that as early as we can get it?

THE COURT: That was the date requested, that was the date I discussed, and there is no other date that I discussed with them.

MR. MOORE: Okay.

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MR. McMASTER: Judge, can I make an inquiry about that?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. McMASTER: I certainly don't oppose getting a list of the jurors, I think it will be helpful for both sides.

I would like clarification. If the information that's going to be provided to the State and the Defense is going to include such information as dates of birth, specific addresses or anything along those lines. And if it does, I'd like some guidance from the Court about disclosure of any of that information to parties other than the parties involved in the trial. RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: Yeah, this might be a good place to deal with that, and we'll address it in this motion.

I'm going to grant the motion, and the list will be provided on the date I just gave you. Is that February 18th?

MR. MOORE: That's what you said.

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THE COURT: Okay. February 18th, 2014. What I understand the list will consist of is the normal list - the normal sheet that we get in every case. I didn't ask for anything more.

I do think -- you know, when we pick the jury, the jurors are going to be numbered, so their names are not to be used. Obviously this list is not going to have those numbers on it. But when they come out, they're going to have -- when they walk into the room, they're going to have a number on them. And it is the Order of the Court not to refer to them by name, but by number.

I will refer to them by number. Everyone will refer to them by number. But you will have their names and you will have -- I don't know if that standard sheet -- I believe it does not have their addresses, it just has the city.

MR. McMASTER: That's correct, Judge, and it does not have their dates of birth, which brings me to Motion Number 32.

RYAN REPORTING

The Defense in Motion Number 32 is asking for prosecutorial investigations of prospective jurors so that they don't have to duplicate any State effort in any investigations that we do of the backgrounds of the jurors to ensure that they're qualified.

I can tell the Court that in practice, the information that the State is provided by the Court is not particularly helpful in conducting any kind of meaningful background investigation.

We do not have the dates of birth. Many times we don't have the middle names. The information that we have makes it extremely difficult to match up a prospective juror with any information that we may have access to through our own database or through any of the law enforcement officers' databases.

So, at best, we are guessing for the most part, as to any particular name that we are given as a prospective juror as to what particular criminal history they may have, which is what I understand the Defense is primarily interested in.

And I just bring that to the Court's attention because without that information, we would certainly be opposing turning over any prospective or prosecutorial investigations of the prospective jurors because I can't guarantee that the information I would be giving to the RYAN REPORTING

Defense has any relationship to the prospective jurors.

THE COURT: Would it be helpful if the list included their date of birth?

MR. McMASTER: Certainly to the State.

MR. MOORE: It would be. I mean, we -- the piece of the sheet that the Court's talking about, the information sheet is, to be blunt, it's worthless. We don't get anything out of that.

THE COURT: I don't know what else do you want. I mean, that's what the jury clerks get.

MR. MOORE: I don't sit at counsel table for the State, and I don't know what investigations they do. And Mr. McMaster has addressed that, and if they for example find criminal histories of defendants or any related information which could be in another context considered Brady evidence because of their ties to law enforcement, because of their ties with prosecutors or those sorts of things, which I don't know whether Mr. McMaster, I'm sure he wouldn't, a Prosecutor's not going to turn that over absent a Court Order, but we would certainly want to know about it in voir dire.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: So, it's those sorts of things. Not just criminal history, but for any reason why they may be predisposed to being sympathetic to one side or the

other.

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THE COURT: Okay. I'm still in -- you all moved kind of to Number 32. I'm still on Number 31. I'm going to grant that with regard to that motion. The Court's going to provide you the list by February the 18th, 2014. The list is considered confidential. It's not to be distributed beyond the attorneys.

Now, Mr. McMaster, I'll have that list include the date of births. I think the date of births would not be -- would be reasonable.

I'm concerned about the address, because I think -if I get you the date of births, are you going to be
okay with that? If I get you -- you're going to have
the city. Just not going to have their full address.

MR. McMASTER: That's fine, Judge. The date of birth is what was most important to the State.

THE COURT: I mean, I know what you normally do, and I would think you would need the date of birth to be able to do that.

MR. McMASTER: Well, I know that the Court in several of the trials that we have had together, I've had information come up and I couldn't confirm whether or not the individual juror was the person who I had obtained criminal records on, and we had to verify each one individually through the jury clerks.

RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: I'm going to say the date of birth and full name, if available to the jury clerks.

MR. MOORE: Could we also have the city of residence?

THE COURT: It is on there. That's on there, what I understand. The city of residence is on there.

MR. McMASTER: Yes.

THE COURT: And I didn't realize that you weren't getting enough of the full name. Full names as available to the jury clerks. I can't imagine they don't have the full name, but they're only going to have what they have, because it's what's on their driver's license, I believe.

Okay. Anything else with regard to Number 31? MR. McMASTER: No, ma'am.

MR. LANNING: Judge, this is the first that counsel's become aware of the Court ordering parties to refer to jurors by number.

THE COURT: Judge Dugan has done it. We've had some unusual requests recently by the public with regard to transcripts, which would include the jury's names, and so, we've made a decision, the Judges, to go to a system — I mean, Judge Dugan has done it for some time — so, we've made a decision to go to a system which includes numbers, so that the jurors' names are not mentioned out

loud to the general public in jury selection or during the course of the trial.

You will have their names. You will have their names.

MR. LANNING: Right.

THE COURT: You will. But it's not to be referred to. For instance, during jury selection, the way we previously did it, we referred to the jurors as their names, and --

MR. LANNING: And I'm just picturing a real difficulty not doing that.

THE COURT: Well, they're going to have a tag right here, it's going to say Number 15. Right there. So -- they're big, they're like this big. So, you're going to be able -- it's going to be right there and it's going to be available to see. And if you would --

We're going to start this procedure January 27th, and we're going -- we have not done this before, this has recently come up. I know Judge Dugan has used numbers for approximately a year. We had some recent requests for disclosures of jurors that were unusual, that caused some concerns for us with regard to their confidentiality. And I think it would be appropriate to refer to them as numbers instead of their names.

MR. LANNING: Well, having just heard about it, ask RYAN REPORTING

for opportunity to look into it and if at some future point, if appropriate to do so, bring it up.

THE COURT: I'll be certainly open to hear that.

And you're welcome to come in and watch jury selection or see how it works starting January 27th, or to watch how Judge Dugan does it.

I have had a conversation with Judge Dugan about how they do it. They said it hasn't been a problem.

You know, we always laugh in our courtroom that we pronounce people's names not very well, and so, maybe the numbers would be a little easier than some of the jurors' last names.

MR. MOORE: Is this going to be across the board, Judge, for all cases?

THE COURT: We're doing it in all cases starting January 27th.

MR. MOORE: All circuit judges are all --

THE COURT: It's my understanding that after the discussion that we had, most of the circuit judges are going towards that. We are even going as far as doing an administrative order with regard to that. Now, after the administrative order, they'll have to do that. But most of us are starting it now. So, I think it would be appropriate to do that.

So, I'll be happy to hear any objections to that.

RYAN REPORTING

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MR. MOORE: We do have a need to talk to the Court at the bench about the jury information sheet.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Bench conference was had as follows:)

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MOORE: We have -- we will be assisted by a jury selection specialist.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOORE: And she has requested those information sheets. And she's a professional, she's a Ph.D. She's been involved in a number of cases and she understands the work product and the attorney/client privilege and all the limitations that the Court and the Rules of Ethics and the law impose on the disclosure of sensitive information. And she would, when directed, directed by us, I don't even think it's necessary, but we would direct her not to disclose that information to anybody.

But I'm just saying, the Court has just said we can't divulge it to anybody, putting limits on it, but she would have to be included in that circle.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm glad you -- I mean, I didn't know if that was going to be an issue, no one said anything, so I'm glad you brought that to my attention.

Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: The Court's discretion.

RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: I'll put list to be disclosed to the 1 attorneys and under their supervision can be disclosed 2 3 to their experts. MR. MOORE: That ought to cover it. 4 THE COURT: I mean, should I put jury selection 5 6 experts? MR. MOORE: Well, just experts in there. She's the 7 only one I anticipate we're going to send it to. But if 8 9 we give it to anybody else, we would inform the Court and the State. But at this point she's the only one we 10 11 intend to give it to. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 12 MR. McMASTER: There may be some exposure to the 13 investigators in our office to assist in running 14 15 criminal background checks. MR. PIRROLO: And be the same with our 16 17 investigators? 18 MR. MOORE: Yeah, of course. 19 MR. PIRROLO: Can I include the investigators from our office, as well? 20 THE COURT: I'll put and investigators. Didn't say 21 whether they are the State or the Defense. 22 23 Okay. Thank you, sir. (Bench conference was concluded, after which the 24 25 following proceedings were had:)

THE COURT: Okay. Are we done with Number 31?

MR. McMASTER: I believe so.

MR. MOORE: We are.

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THE COURT: Okay. We'll move to 32.

MR. MOORE: Well, we got into that a little bit, but any information gleaned by the State with respect to the prospective jurors, and I think it would only be fair that we would have to provide reciprocal discovery of whatever we learn, but that should be made available to us. And not just limit it to criminal histories, but any involvement that a person has that could influence the person's predilection or sympathy, I guess, toward one side or the other. And that could be connection with law enforcement, it could be probation and parole, it could be any number of things, which would be recognizable as influencing a person's leanings one way or the other.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Well, Judge starting with the easy set first. If there are criminal histories of the prospective jurors, I don't have any problem turning over the conviction information and any information about pending charges or any investigations that the State's aware of.

With respect to the other information, if it falls RYAN REPORTING

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THE COURT: Juste one second. You said pending charges and what came after that?

MR. McMASTER: Or investigations that the State would be aware of.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMASTER: I mean, I can't just turn over the NCIC-FCIC reports that may be generated. Those are not allowed to be turned over by us. The substance of the information with respect to convictions I'd be more than happy to detail and provide to counsel. And if State becomes aware of any pending cases or investigations, we'll certainly turn that information over, also.

I just don't want the Order to be such that the State is going to be compelled to go out there and look into every prospective juror's life and turn it upside down and then turn any information that we get, over to the Defense.

It's not what the State does, not even in these cases. And if any information is generated that would qualify as impeaching information or Brady type information, certainly the State's aware of its obligations to turn that over and we will do that.

MR. MOORE: I didn't suggest in any way that the

State conduct any investigations on our behalf. I don't

RYAN REPORTING

know where that conclusion could have come from.

But I'm asking for the State to give us what they have, what they discover, what they stumble onto, to turn that over to us.

THE COURT: Okay. I heard conviction information, pending charges or pending investigations and any Brady and impeachment information. What else would there be, Mr. Moore?

MR. MOORE: Any connections with law enforcement, for example, which might have an impact on the way a jury perceives a case or in the way they would vote at the case.

THE COURT: Normally wouldn't you solicit that information during jury selection?

MR. MOORE: I know, we do, but if the State comes across that information, and they have more resources than we do, if they're aware of it, then that falls within a category of what we're asking that the State provide to us.

Not conduct an investigation. We're not conducting investigations for them, they're not doing it for us. But if they come across information like that during the course of their preparing for trial, then it should be given to us. That's what I'm saying.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

RYAN REPORTING

MR. McMASTER: I don't know where I'd go to find out 1 if somebody has any particular law enforcement 3 connections, other than the questions that we ask them 4 when they come into court in the first place. 5 So, if I happen to run over anything like that and stumble into it, and I think it's going to make a 6 7 difference, I'll certainly be turning that over. MR. MOORE: Okay. And I think I --8 9 THE COURT: I don't know how to put that in a Court 10 Order. MR. MOORE: Criminal histories, connections with law 11 12 enforcement. 13 THE COURT: I'll put connections with law

enforcement.

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MR. McMASTER: If it's in the possession of the State, Judge.

THE COURT: If it's in the possession of the State.

MR. MOORE: And I think I understood Mr. McMaster to say those documents that they can't give us, NCIC reports, however they can't give those to us, but they can give us the substance of them, is what I heard him to say.

THE COURT: They can give you a what?

MR. MOORE: The substance of what's in the report.

THE COURT: Yes, that's what I understand. RYAN REPORTING

haven't had an issue with that before. They have been forthcoming with that information in the trials that my prosecutors have been in front of me with that information.

Okay. So, with regard to Number 32, I'll grant that with the limitations and the information that we discussed that they'll disclose. And I'll put that specifically in the Order.

Okay. Number 33 we addressed previously. So, Number 34.

MR. MOORE: This, Judge, given the media coverage and the fact that the victim is a police officer and this is a death-penalty case, I would ask the Court by my motion to do a voir dire of the jury, not as to the substance of their verdict or any information about their deliberations, but rather to ask a generic question of whether at that point, if we get to this point, if the Defendant is found guilty of first-degree murder, that they would be able to keep an open mind and be fair and impartial in their deliberations at that point, if they're capable of doing that. Or not.

I mean, it's a fair question that doesn't invade the province of the jury or the deliberation process, which we can't get into absent good cause, but it would be justified to ask the jury at that point, given the

sensitivity of the circumstances in this case, to ask

whether at that point they can proceed on to the penalty

phase and be fair and impartial and would be open to

mitigating circumstances. Whether they can be open

And if they say no, which is conceivable, then they shouldn't be on the jury. And so, that's why it would be a fair question, without invading the province of the jury, for the Court to inquire. Very simple inquiry. No followup questions, just can you or can't you.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, in the Coday case that the State submitted to the Court earlier today --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

minded at that point.

MR. McMASTER: -- I believe there was, on Page 16 of that opinion, there was an attempt by the defense to conduct juror interviews during the death penalty phase, regarding their attitudes and whatever, and that was disapproved of by the Florida Supreme Court.

It's the State's position that it's not provided for in the Rules, and it's opening up a whole can of worms with respect to getting into the jurors' thought processes and why they returned a particular verdict.

I know that in his motion he wants to find out whether any of the attitudes of the jury have changed RYAN REPORTING

toward the Defendant due to the unique circumstances of this case.

Well, Judge, if the jurors during the guilt portion of this case after the complete voir dire has been done, they've been seated and they have heard the entire trial and returned a guilty verdict that gets us to the penalty phase, if their attitudes toward the Defendant haven't changed, I would be amazed.

The Florida Supreme Court has not seen a need to allow additional voir dire following the guilt phase. The Coday case on Page 16 indicates that it would be improper to allow questioning of the jurors at that stage without going through the formal process of filing the affidavits and following the rules that would allow an inquiry of the jurors.

So, the State opposes this motion. We'd ask that it be denied.

MR. MOORE: Well, in the Coday case, the Defendant's asking during the penalty phase to interview the jurors regarding their media -- exposure to media reports. And so, we're not asking for that. We're not asking for specific information that they have.

And let me be specific; I thought I was. I'm not asking to delve into whether just as a generic question they suddenly feel differently. You know, once they

found -- if they find Mr. Bradley guilty of first-degree murder, do you feel differently about him. That's not what I asked.

I put it more specifically, more succinctly. That is, that the juror is asked, at this point having found Mr. Bradley guilty of first-degree murder, do you believe that you can continue onto the penalty phase and be fair and impartial in determining aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Can you keep an open mind in evaluating evidence that's presented to you regarding mitigating circumstances.

It's not an inquiry into their exposure to media coverage, and it's not during the penalty phase. This is pre -- this is after presumably a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder and before they begin deliberating at the penalty phase. And it's a question unrelated to their deliberations.

And it's very specific in what we're asking for.

And we would not propose to ask any followup questions.

It's just a very simple yes or no; you can do it, no,

you can't do it.

And because at that point if they can't -- if they say because of what I've heard, I cannot consider mitigating circumstances, they shouldn't be sitting at the penalty phase. And the only way to find out about RYAN REPORTING

it is to ask them.

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So, it's not an unfair, it's not an unreasonable request, and it does not intrude into the jury deliberation process. And I believe it's discretionary with the Court. It's certainly not prevented by the Coday case.

THE COURT: Number 34, the motion is denied.

Motion Number 35.

MR. MOORE: 35. Motion for Special Verdict as to Theory of Guilt. In this case, the State has charged a first degree premeditated murder, they've also charged a robbery and of course they can seek a conviction on either or both, felony murder and first degree premeditated murder.

But without guidance from the jury as to which theory they relied upon, whether it's one or the other or both, then it would inform the Court, if the Court had that information, of let's say they were proceeding on a felony murder theory, as to how to treat one of the potential aggravating circumstances. We don't know for sure, because there's cold calculated, premeditated; I don't recall the State's position on that. When I asked Mr. McMaster before our last hearing, he was thinking about it. So, unless they have decided one way or the other on that, we're still left to guess.

RYAN REPORTING

But if the State were to propose that as an aggravating circumstances after the jury returned a special verdict that they are basing their conviction of first-degree murder on a felony murder theory, then we certainly have an impact on whether the Court chose to give the instruction on cold calculated, premeditated. It would prevent the Court from doing that, in my view.

And so, the courts in this state give special jury verdicts with respect to whether a firearm is used, whether a weapon is used, and so it's not without precedent that the jury is asked to give its opinion about a fact that the jury is required to find.

So, we're not invading the province of the jury there either. And it gives the Court more information to use in deciding what to instruct the jury on and even what aggravators to find when the Court gets around to deciding what sentence to impose and what to impose that sentence upon.

So, my request is a specific special jury verdict with respect to the theory of first-degree murder, whether it's felony murder or premeditated murder, either, if the jury relies upon in arriving at its verdict.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, this is similar to the special RYAN REPORTING

verdict form that they requested with respect to the aggravators. In fact, in the motion, Mr. Moore on Page 3 of the motion indicates that the case of State versus Steele is against him, where that Court held that the Trial Court departs from the essential requirements of law by using a special penalty phase jury form, but then they're continuing to argue that one is called for, although it looks like here they're talking about unanimous finding as to aggravating circumstances, which is what I think the issue was in Steele. 

The State would ask the Court to consider two separate cases. One is the Supreme Court case, Florida Supreme Court case of England versus State, that's at 940 So.2d 389, it's a 2006 decision. And in that case on Page 10, they refer to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Schad versus Arizona, that's S C H A D. That's at 111 Supreme Court 2491.

I have copies for the Court and counsel. May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McMASTER: In the England decision at Page 10, the Court noted under the provision marked B, Special Verdict Form, that in Schad the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution did not require the jury to come to a unanimous decision on the theory of first-degree RYAN REPORTING

murder, and that separate verdict forms for felony and premeditated murder were not required.

And in Johnston, this Court held the Trial Courts need not submit special verdict forms to the jury regarding the alternate theories of felony first-degree murder and premeditated first-degree murder.

In fact, the cases hold that they're not required to come to a unanimous decision on which theory of guilt each particular juror may believe in, as long as 12 of them believe that one or the other theory has been proven.

The Supreme Court of both the Florida Supreme Court and the United States indicate that the Defense request would not be a valid request. It should be denied.

MR. MOORE: Let me reiterate that this is not a penalty phase request where Steele would be applicable because Steele dealt with a specific -- a special penalty phase verdict form. We're asking for a guilt phase verdict form.

Specific jury verdict forms at the guilt phase are routinely used. And the examples that I gave were the use of a firearm, where the burglar is armed, and those warrant a special verdict form.

The Florida Supreme Court decided in Haliburton versus State at 561 248 in 1990, that a special verdict RYAN REPORTING

form is not required, but it doesn't prohibit the use of that.

And so, we're not -- the Court should not rely on Steele, and despite what motion says, I do not agree that Steele is a conflict of what we're requesting, because Steele focuses on the use of that specific special jury verdict form at the penalty phase. We're asking for one at the guilt phase.

And so, it does not invade the province of the jury. It could be an additional fact that is required to be proved at the penalty phase, which is whether this is cold calculated, premeditated, and although it's at the guilt phase, it does inform the Court and would help the Court in finding whether that particular aggravating circumstances should be found if let's say the jury found that this is a felony murder and not a premeditated murder.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to the Defense's Motion Number 35, that motion is denied.

Okay. Number 36.

MR. MOORE: I'm going to reserve this for the charge conference. I'd ask the Court to reserve ruling on this motion.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: No objection.

RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: Okay. Number 37.

MR. MOORE: Motion to Declare Section 921.141

Florida Statutes Unconstitutional in Light of Apprendi because only a bare majority of jurors is sufficient to recommend a death sentence. It's addressed in Steele, State versus Steele, and they concluded that until Ring is revisited and overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, that Ring will be the law of the land here in Florida.

However, the Florida Supreme Court was sufficiently bothered by it to recommend that the legislature revisit the issue of whether State of Florida would remain the outlier state and the only state where a finding of an aggravating circumstance or a recommendation of death can be by less than unanimity. And the legislature's response is then to speed up executions.

And so, it's a violation of Ring, it's a violation of Apprendi for Florida to commit a death recommendation based on a mere majority.

And I would point out in contrast, all the other states require unanimity, at least in finding an aggravating circumstance or in rendering a verdict of death.

And the Federal Death Penalty Act requires not only notice of the aggravating factors, but a death sentence be made unanimously.

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So, I'm asking for those reasons. I acknowledge the holding of the Florida Supreme Court in Steele and other cases. And however, I'm requesting the Court consider the motion and grant it finding Florida's death penalty statute unconstitutional.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Once again, Judge, the Defense acknowledges that the law is against them as cited by the Steele case that they've put in their motion, and as well as the Foster case that I've been citing last week and this week.

Florida Supreme Court has specifically held that the standard jury instructions properly inform the jury of its role and correctly state the law.

So, we would ask that Number 37 be denied.

THE COURT: Motion Number 37 by the Defense is denied.

Motion Number 38.

MR. MOORE: 38, Motion to Declare Statute 921.141
Unconstitutional for Failure to Provide a Jury Adequate
Guidance in the Finding of Sentencing Circumstances and
Preclude a Death Sentence. All they are given are
aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and
told to come back with a verdict.

And I mean, there are more instructions, but they RYAN REPORTING

don't elaborate much more on the basic goal that they're given, but basic responsibility.

So, there's no guidance to them. There are 15 aggravating circumstances; they could pick one or two each, and still arrive at a death recommendation which is less than unanimous under Florida's death penalty sentencing scheme.

So, we would ask the Court to find it -- again acknowledging the existence of the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court holdings, we would ask the Court to find Florida Statute unconstitutional on those grounds.

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Once again, the Foster decision's pretty much on point on that.

And you know, Judge, I have to point out that in the last several months, there have been two executions approved by the Florida Supreme Court and stays denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.

It seems to me that if there was a problem that a

Court has found with the constitutionality of the

process that the State of Florida is using, one of those

Courts might have noticed something.

It's the State's position that the instructions adequately state the law, adequately guide the jury and RYAN REPORTING

the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Motion Number 38 by the Defense is denied.

Motion Number 39.

MR. MOORE: This will be the final motion that I have, Your Honor. That would be the Motion ot Exclude Evidence or Argument Designed to Create Sympathy.

And in this case, the problem is, due to the factors of the case, that this is a case that lends itself to an emotional involvement on the part of the jury. How can they not be. But there has to be a limit. They have to rely on the facts and the law and not be unduly influenced by emotion.

And we're asking that the State -- and I've seen it, it's like one of those situations where you can't maybe describe it, but you know it when you see it, especially if you're an experienced prosecutor for the Defense or for the State.

We're asking that an effort be made not to go in that direction and present evidence merely for the emotional impactive value. I'm not casting any aspersions on Mr. McMaster, but however, in a case like this, the temptation is great and we all could find ourselves in situations where we are dealing with evidence that is presented which appears to be mainly RYAN REPORTING

for the emotional impact value.

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And so, I'm asking the Court to be mindful of that. I can't think of a way that the Court could put in black and white, State, don't do this, don't do that, but however, other than to avoid or to -- to avoid presenting evidence solely for the emotional impact value. That's what we're asking in this case. And we will object as we deem appropriate.

THE COURT: Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, I believe Mr. Brown addressed the victim impact evidence that the State intends to introduce in the penalty phase portion. I believe he indicated that the State would have that reduced to writing, would present a copy to counsel for their review and we would hash out any differences before it be submitted to the jury.

Similarly, with respect to the other evidence. The State intends to try this case based on the facts, not the sympathies involved.

Obviously it's a very sympathetic situation for the deputy and her family or the members of the community.

But this case will be tried on its facts. State's aware of its obligations and we will comply with them.

MR. MOORE: We're not just focusing on the penalty phase, though. This is a global, entire trial; voir

dire, guilt and penalty phase we're asking.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to this motion, I will reserve ruling. Allow you to make specific objections. At the time when you believe the evidence or arguments pertain to this motion, you can readdress it at that time.

Okay. Mr. Moore, with regard to 40, there was a lot of different information. Assume this was supplemental information. I didn't know if there was anything that the Court needed -- I thought that this was supplemental information --

MR. MOORE: That was actually --

THE COURT: -- for your arguments.

MR. MOORE: -- attached to the objection on standard jury instructions, which the Court reserved.

THE COURT: Okay. I did review this, but I wasn't sure where --

MR. MOORE: It was part of that.

THE COURT: Okay. So, it was part of --

MR. MOORE: The one that the Court reserved on, which I think was 28, Objection to Standard Penalty

Phase Jury Instructions. So, that would be the motion,

28 -- that submission would be 28 and 40.

MR. McMASTER: 26?

MR. MOORE: 28.

RYAN REPORTING

- 1 THE COURT: Okay. 28, I denied. MR. McMASTER: Yeah, 26 you reserved on. 2 3 MR. MOORE: 26 is Motions Regarding Photographs. THE COURT: Right. 4 5 MR. MOORE: That's not what I'm talking about. THE COURT: There was another one with regard to the 6 7 standard instructions. MR. MOORE: Penalty phase jury instructions, and I 8 asked the Court to reserve on that or to deal with it when we have the instructions in front of us. 10 11 THE COURT: You know what, I did deny that, but I 12 mean, I'm going to allow you the opportunity to re-argue 13 it if you think it's applicable at that time. MR. MOORE: All right. 14 THE COURT: Okay. The remaining motions, are they 15 what you would consider to be non-death-penalty motions? 16 17 MR. MOORE: We have a number of those, Your Honor, and I have them with me if the Court wants to hear them. 18 THE COURT: What I have is 42, 43, 44, 45, 46. 19 20 MR. MOORE: Let's see.
  - THE COURT: I think we added everything. the Motion to Compel State to Identify Recorded Jail

MR. MOORE: My list goes up to 40.

everything else I've addressed.

THE COURT: That's what would be left. I think

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MR. MOORE: Right. Those are the non-death --

MR. McMASTER: Those are non-death penalties.

MR. MOORE: We can hear them now or we can wait.

We'll have more motions as time goes by, to present, of
a non-death-penalty nature, on the 20th of February,
which is our next go-around. So, we can do that and
include those with the other motions that we present at
that time, if the Court wishes.

THE COURT: Mr. McMaster?

MR. McMASTER: The Court's preference.

THE COURT: Well, I anticipate you're going to have more, and the State may have some.

MR. MOORE: The way these things happen, Judge -THE COURT: No, I understand. I understand. I sit

MR. MOORE: Yes, the answer is yes.

THE COURT: I understand that probably both of you are going to have more. That's why I'm saying, maybe if we have the time right now, we should probably address these, because I anticipate -- I mean, if both sides are ready, that's not what was noticed, but I'm happy to address those and still set aside that time --

MR. MOORE: That's what we'll do.

THE COURT: -- because I anticipate there will be RYAN REPORTING

- more by both or -- by both sides.
- MR. MOORE: Okay.

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- THE COURT: Okay. What I have is Number 42, it's the Motion to Compel State to Identify Recorded Jail Calls.
- 6 MR. MOORE: Right.
- 7 THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed on that.
  - MR. McMASTER: I could make it easy for Mr. Moore.
- 9 MR. MOORE: Okay.
  - MR. McMASTER: Judge, with respect to the jail calls, the State does not intend to utilize any of the jail calls in its case in chief.
    - I can't speak for rebuttal, only because I don't know for sure what the Defense case is going to be yet.
- THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Moore, are you happy with that or --
  - MR. MOORE: I don't know if happy would exactly describe it, but I accept that and I understand that.
  - THE COURT: Okay. You think that's a better word, I'll accept your amendment to -- so, I'll put the Court took no action as the State does not intend to use the recorded jail calls in their case in chief.
  - Okay. The next motion that I have, that I call Number 43, is Motion to Compel State to Identify
    Materials of Which the State Intends to Make Use at

Trial.

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MR. MOORE: To be more specific, recently the State disclosed on December 27th, 71 pages of materials, handwritten, taken from Mr. Bradley's cell, mostly illegible. I've tried to read it to try to make sense out of it, and we're asking for guidance from the State as to what portions of that, if any, the State intends to use.

In our view, it does not comply with the Rules of Discovery if all we're given is a large volume of mostly undecipherable, illegible, handwritten documents of the Defendant's, that the use of which is not obvious even after a failed attempt to read what's in it.

So, if the State intends to use that, we would ask that the State be required to state what portions of those documents the State intends to use.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, I met with Mr. Moore in my office and I showed him the State's copies of the same documents. I got the impression that the State's copies are not much better in quality than the copies that he has been provided. However, I have welcomed him to come to my office at any time that he's able and look through the stuff that I have.

With respect to those documents, I believe it's RYAN REPORTING

clear from the discovery submission, those are documents
that were removed from Mr. Bradley's jail cell, copied
by --

THE COURT: Okay. There's lots of noise; I need to be able to hear, with all due respect.

Okay.

MR. McMASTER: Those are documents that were removed from Mr. Bradley's jail cell, and I believe copied by the Seminole County Sheriff's Office and provided to our office.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McMASTER: We in turn have provided them to the Defense.

How we intend to use them at this point is uncertain. It does appear from the communications that we have had with our potential experts that they may be materials that the experts would like to look at in making their determinations about the issues regarding Mr. Bradley's psychological issues and his ability to waive Miranda rights.

There are some additional materials in there that appear to be in the form of a communication, at least an attempted communication, from Mr. Bradley to others, to pass along a potential defense in this case. And whether we actually use those materials or not depends RYAN REPORTING

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in large part on the Defense tactic and the defenses that they raise during the State's case in chief.

So, with respect to what I refer to as a journal, but it appears to be a handwritten notebook series of pages, that primarily would be background material for a psychologist. The State doesn't see any relevance to the particular issues in this case to introducing that.

With respect to what we consider to be an attempt to manipulate witness testimony, that could be presented either in the case in chief or in rebuttal.

THE COURT: Mr. Moore, I don't know what else you would require the State to do other than the disclosure that they've just made. I don't know what else you're requesting.

MR. MOORE: You know, after that, at least that gives us an idea. So, I think that's about all that we can ask at this point.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think they've given you the material, the copies that they have. I'm going to deny this, but if we need to readdress it, I'll readdress it. But I'm going to deny it.

MR. MOORE: Denied without prejudice.

THE COURT: I'll even put denied without prejudice so there's no misunderstanding.

Number 44 I show as your first Motion in RYAN REPORTING

1 Limine. Looks like there's another Motion in Limine.

This Motion in Limine -- I have Motion in Limine Number

1 and Motion in Limine Number 2. So, this is Number 1.

MR. McMASTER: What number do you have that as, Judge, 44?

THE COURT: This is 44, and this is the Opinion

Testimony by any Witness that the Defendant or the

Driver of any Vehicle in Which the Defendant was a

Passenger Intended to Run Over Law Enforcement Officers.

And then, Number 2, Other Matters and Grounds Will be Argued at Pretrial.

MR. MOORE: Okay. So, the Motion in Limine to
Prohibit Testimony by any Witness of the Defendant or
any Driver of the Vehicle in which the Defendant was a
Passenger Intended to Run Over Law Enforcement Officers.
Of course, the witnesses can testify about what they
saw, but in terms of the witnesses opining or
speculating about the thought process of the driver of
the car, that would be opinion testimony and would be
inadmissible.

I mean, unless they're expert witnesses and they are qualified to render such an opinion, it's speculation, and because of that, it's inadmissible.

What is seen, what is heard is certainly relevant and certainly admissible if relevant. RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: Hear response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, I frankly still am not quite sure where the information came from that either the Defendant or any driver of that particular vehicle on the day of March 6th of 2012, intended to run over law enforcement officers.

The only possible place that could apply to the facts as I understand them would be as the vehicle was being pursued from the Janewood Drive address of Mr. Webber, and then ultimately ended up in the ditch. During that time period it was driving erratically, did leave the roadway. However, it appears to me from the information that I've read that was more in an attempt to avoid the stop-sticks than to attempt to run over any law enforcement officers.

The short version is, the State does not have a theory that Mr. Bradley or anyone intended to run over any law enforcement officers during that chase. He's not been charged with aggravated assault or aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. We do not intend to elicit any testimony from any of the witnesses that that was the intent.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I'm going to grant the motion with regard to Number 44.

MR. MOORE: And ask that -- RYAN REPORTING

THE COURT: They can obviously testify as to what they observed, but they cannot testify as to what was the intent.

MR. MOORE: My concern is, because it came out in depositions from some of the witnesses, that they're going to -- even though they're asked a question about what did you see, that doesn't invite that response, it's going to come out. And so, they need to be instructed not to let that part, unless it's specifically requested and ruled in advance it was relevant and admissible, that they not testify about that.

THE COURT: They can testify as to what they observed, not to what they believe the intent was.

MR. MOORE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Number 44 is Motion in Limine Number 2, that's Number 44 -- or that's Number 45, sorry. Number 45, Mr. Moore.

MR. MOORE: Motion to Instruct the Witnesses to

Control Their Emotions. They're human, there's close,
interpersonal relationships with Deputy Pill, but as I
said in an earlier motion, the facts and the law need to
be what the jury relies upon. And to the extent that it
can be done, that the witnesses be encouraged, be
instructed, to control their testimony so that they are

RYAN REPORTING

1 | able to control their emotions.

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THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, that's something we do pretty much -- at least I do -- in pretty much every trial that I have. I ask the witnesses to be professional, to control their emotions and to behave appropriately on the stand.

Obviously there are going to be some strong emotions in this case. Whether the witnesses are going to be able to do it or not is a different thing, but certainly the State has no problem in conveying to our witnesses that they are to attempt to be as professional as possible.

THE COURT: The State's Motion Number 45, Motion in Limine Number 2, is granted.

Then I have Number -- what I have is Number 46.

Motion in Limine Uniform Police Presence in the

Courtroom.

MR. MOORE: Mr. Pirrolo's going to present that motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PIRROLO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. PIRROLO: Judge, I cited a couple of cases within the motion. I have them for the Court and for RYAN REPORTING

the State, as well.

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May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. PIRROLO: Judge, there's also a copy of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office Procedure as it is specific to uniforms and when on-duty and off-duty police officers within the Brevard County Sheriff's Office are allowed to use them.

Judge, our concern is going to be that throughout this trial there will be a large law enforcement presence in the courtroom, meaning in the gallery, watching the trial occur.

Obviously BCSO is the agency involved in the case, as a matter of Deputy Pill, as a matter of all the -the majority of the law enforcement personnel that investigated the case are Brevard County Sheriff's Office. Melbourne Police Department was invovled, as well. The State Troopers were involved, as well.

So, obviously the ones that are being called in as witnesses, they will be sequestered; that's not the concern. The concern is that throughout the trial, whether it's three weeks, four weeks, they will come in and observe, and we reasonably will assume that they will be sitting behind the State and pretty much take up a large portion on that side of the courtroom.

What that does, Judge, it unfairly prejudices Mr. Bradley. The jurors are always observing during the trials, every trial I've been a part of, as focused as they are on the witness, they hear the door open, they turn and they see who comes into the courtroom. They observe that. They will see whether it's two officers or 30, they will acknowledge that. And in a way it conveys a message, an improper message to the jury.

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And two of the cases that I've provided talk about that. The first one is Shootes, it's S H O O T E S, versus State, decision out of the first DCA of Florida, 2009.

And what happened in this case, it wasn't the entire trial, this was just on the last day. The last day of trial, it was an aggravated assault on a police officer. The last day of trial, they moved the trial to a bigger courtroom because they were expecting more people to come in for closing argument, and what transpired during closing arguments was that large numbers of police officers came in to listen to the closing arguments.

The record was clear of the amount of officers that came in. It was clear that they were all either in full uniform or at least some clothing that identified them as law enforcement. Whether it was a T-shirt in some RYAN REPORTING

instances, or a polo shirt that indicated they were from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, but regardless, it was without question they were employed one way or another with the Sheriff's Office in Jacksonville.

And the Court found it to be prejudicial, and it reversed the conviction. It deprived the Defendant, in that case Mr. Shootes, a fair trial, his due process rights were violated, and on Page 4 of the opinion, on the right-hand column, it talks about how the judges are not free to disregard factors external to the evidence, such as the atmosphere in and around the courtroom, which may influence a jury's verdict.

The Sixth Amendment imposes upon Trial Courts an affirmative obligation to minimize any risk of unacceptable factors affecting the accused right to a fair trial. They cite a Federal case which I have, as well included in the packet, that is the Woods case, Woods versus Dugger, that stemmed from the Middle District of Florida and then went up to the 11th Circuit of Appeals in Atlanta.

But it also indicates that the Courts have an obligation to insure that the trial's a fair process and an obligation to protect jurors from any possibility of influence or intimidation by the appearance of a uniformly outfitted sea of spectators.

RYAN REPORTING

Conversely, Judge, in a Southern District of
Florida case, U.S. versus Yahweh, which was also cited
in this opinion and the Shootes opinion, there was a
pretrial order that allowed 60 supporters of multiple
defendants that they could attend the jury trial, but
they were not to be dressed in white turbans or flowing
robes that were indicative of the Defendant's religious
group.

So, in this case, Judge, first of all, with all due respect, if the officer is on duty, they need to be on duty; whether it's patrolling, whatever their duty is for the Sheriff's Department or Melbourne Police Department, that's what they should be doing when they're on duty.

If they are off duty, and that's where the procedure printout that I've given to the Court indicates is on Page 2 of that, Paragraph E, Number 2, employees will wear only the uniform specified for their assignment. Number 3, employees may wear his or her prescribed uniform during special assignments or functions as authorized with the employee's supervisor.

An example of such functions are parades, approved civic functions, law enforcement-related funerals, etcetera.

A trial is not a parade; it's clearly not an RYAN REPORTING

approved civic function.

If the officer's off, if he or she has a day off, and they come in in street clothes, no polo shirts, no hats, no T-shirts that show they are a member of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office or Melbourne Police Department or any other law enforcement agency, obviously the Court cannot stop them from coming in.

We are concerned is, we're going to have a sea of green or blue or both in the courtroom day in and day out. It doesn't have to be the entire day, but the jurors will see that. They will observe that each time the door opens, they hear the door open, and as the cases get into, it's sending a message to the jurors. And it's a message that should not be sent to the jurors.

The only message that should be sent to the jurors is that they need to weigh the evidence that comes from the witness stand and from exhibits, and rely their verdict on that, not some outside presence.

Staying with the Shootes case, Judge, on Page 5 of the opinion, it talked about how there was a substantial number of the uniformed officers and they were not present for preserving the order in the courtroom. So, the Court can limit that. We're not, again, asking the deputies that work for the court, that will be in this RYAN REPORTING

courtroom, that they can't wear their uniforms. We're just asking for just outside police officers that have nothing to do with protecting the courtroom or the Judge. It's just outside personnel is what this is specifically geared to.

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And again, the Court specifically says it's preserving an order in the courtroom or to provide testimony in proceedings, that jury's susceptible to the impression that the officers are there to communicate a message to the jury. And they cite the Woods case, as well, the Federal Court case.

So, the Courts have understood that that's what occurs to the jury. I mean, I'm sure the officers aren't here intentionally trying to spread that message, but it's a message that the jurors have gotten in other cases, and the Courts, definitely the District Court of Appeals in Florida and the Federal Appellate Courts, have understood it's just human nature.

And again, it states that the only message that should be sent should come from the Judge and from the evidence presented and not from any other outside influences.

The Federal case, Judge, that I provided, as well, Woods versus Dugger, it is 923 Federal 2d 1454. Again, it is a decision that started in the Middle District of RYAN REPORTING

Florida. And the Court ruled that the hostile atmosphere prevented the Defendant from obtaining a fair trial.

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This occurred up near Starke. They actually had considerable testimony indicating that almost an overwhelming majority of that town is employed by the prison in one way or another; whether corrections officers or other employment within the prison system there in Starke. And again, that was in the Woods case, a corrections officer was killed while doing his duties in the prison.

So, clearly that had a large number of law enforcement personnel at the trial, viewing it, and they were wearing various uniforms, whether it was law enforcement or showing that they were somehow employed by the Department of Corrections in that area.

They came up with a test that the Court needs to look at, a test as to look at whether it's inherent prejudice, it's not whether the jurors actually articulate a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but rather whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.

It requires that there first be a test whether there is an impermissible factor coming into play, and second whether it poses an unacceptable risk. And RYAN REPORTING

clearly there is an unacceptable risk. It's the probability that the jurors will be given this message they should not be given.

There's no reason to have uniformed law enforcement in the gallery of the courtroom. Again, if they are going to be testifying, then they're going to be coming in one-by-one.

We already have discussed the security detail for the courtroom, so we're not talking about those people. These are just the outside people.

And Judge, it is not far fetched, I believe this is very reasonable. We all understand and we respect how law enforcement officers are with each other. They are very close. And there is a brotherhood that occurs with them working with each other, regardless if it's ten days or ten years. They are very close. And it's understandable that a fellow law enforcement officer would want to come in here and watch portions of the trial. And we're not saying that they shouldn't be allowed in here. But we're saying that they should not come in in full uniform or somehow wearing something that signifies to the jurors that I'm a law enforcement officer or I work with law enforcement.

There have been cases where, depending on the victim in the case, a lot of people tend to start RYAN REPORTING

1 | wearing buttons or T-shirts, and that's been regulated.

2 You can't keep the people out. But you can keep some of

those things from happening and improperly influencing a

4 jury.

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There is no State interest here, a reason why the State needs the law enforcement personnel behind them. It's clearly going to add to the sympathies, impermissibly to the sympathies of the jury. It's almost going to be a silent victim impact statement given throughout the whole trial.

One law enforcement officer in after another, jurors are going to pick up on that. Obviously see that this person is missed and understandably and rightfully so.

But again, we need to make sure, and this Court needs to make sure that Mr. Bradley gets a fair trial. And in this particular instance, the only way I can see around it, is if the Court instruct the State that they instruct their law enforcement officers that if they're going to come to watch, to observe, that they be dressed in street clothes. No one can tell if they're a law enforcement officer or not.

And again, we know that's possible because part of our agreement with the security detail in here, we've worked that out. That's not completely unfair.

RYAN REPORTING

And again, with the procedures that I've given to the Court that are outlined by the Sheriff's Department, I think while they're on duty or off duty, there's only limited times that they can wear them. This isn't one of those times that's outlined by the Sheriff. And again, if they are on the clock, then they are out on the road or doing whatever other duties that they need to be doing.

THE COURT: Okay. Response from the State.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, first of all, the State has little or no control over who comes into the courtroom to watch the proceedings. Obviously we have control over our witnesses, but as I understand the Defense argument, they're not concerned about the witnesses appearing in uniform, since they would be sequestered.

THE COURT: It would pertain to the witnesses and the security personnel for the courtroom.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

To the extent that the Defense is aiming their concerns at some sort of policy by either the Sheriff's Office or the Melbourne Police Department or the Florida Highway Patrol or whatever, of attempting to amass a uniform presence of officers for the purposes of this trial, and attempting to communicate a message to the jurors, it seems to me their motion should be directed RYAN REPORTING

to those agencies, not to the State. And that the agencies should be given an opportunity to appear and present any position that they think might be appropriate.

Having said that, it's clear from the cases that the Defense has cited, that this Court certainly has the ability and the power to control the nature and the makeup of the persons watching this trial, to the extent that any of their clothing is going to attempt to communicate any kind of message. So, that part is certainly up to the Court.

I would suggest that it's something that's probably going to have to be handled on a day-by-day basis, because I don't think there's any way of knowing who is going to try to come to the courtroom to watch the proceedings, nor any way of knowing who's going to get here first and actually is able to get in.

As the Court well knows, most of the trials that we conduct here have few, if any, observers, other than perhaps some of the victims that wish to sit through and some of the courthouse regulars, but most of them can be counted on one hand as to who's going to be here.

So, I'll leave it to the Court's discretion to fashion a manner in which to control the crowd dressing.

And as I said, if the Court wishes or it has some

concern that there's some sort of unified response by any of the law enforcement agencies, I would request that the agencies be given notice of a hearing and notice to appear at the non-death-penalty hearing time.

THE COURT: Mr. Pirrolo, my concern is I can direct the State -- because the Motion in Limine at this point, I only have the jurisdiction to direct the State that with regard to off-duty police officers. If you want it to expand to Brevard County Sheriff's Office and to expand to the Melbourne Police Department, then I can direct Mr. McMaster to advise them, each agency, that off-duty police officers are not to wear their uniforms if they intend to observe this trial.

I mean, are you satisfied with that or do you want to have a hearing where we notify Melbourne Police

Department and notify Brevard County Sheriff's Deputies?

You might want to push that button, just for purposes of not being recorded. Normally we have it on hearing, but it's on the record.

Nope, they just moved it to hearing, so you won't be recorded.

MR. PIRROLO: Judge, I believe what the Court thought about having Mr. McMaster advise those agencies would be fine. But the other concern we have, as well, and maybe the courtroom deputies can maybe assist as it

goes on.

2.0

This came up at the last hearing we had last week, about how far the media attention has been with this. At the beginning of the case I had filed a motion that pertained to the media in getting some discovery in the case. And after that hearing I supplemented the record with some CDs, DVDs that contained the media reports and a pretty large stack of media reports from around the country. And they went as far west as I believe Dallas or Houston, Texas, and as far north as Buffalo, New York, and as far south obviously as Miami, or I think maybe there was even a story in the Keys.

So, there is a concern that law enforcement could come up from -- could come from Orlando, they could come from Dade County, from Broward County, to see this happen, to watch the trial.

So, perhaps at the right times, if the courtroom deputies start seeing law enforcement personnel walk into the courtroom -- I know in every trial, one of the first questions they ask anyone walking into a trial is, are you a witness in this case, what are you doing here, because they want to make sure that the Rule of Sequestration doesn't get violated. So, if they see someone in law enforcement uniform or law enforcement -- some sort of law enforcement insignia, that they ask, RYAN REPORTING

are you a witness in this case, and if you are then you shouldn't be in here. And if they're not, probably bring it to the Court's attention, because this is a concern we have and I think it's a very legitimate concern.

2.2

And again, we're not faulting them for wanting to come in here and watch the trial. But there's got to be a balance here, that we've got to prevent a jury of seeing five officers, ten officers. I mean, I can't tell the Court how many officers are going to be here because we don't know what's going to happen on that particular day.

So, I think it would be fine with the Court giving sort of an Order to Mr. McMaster that the State
Attorney's Office at least give notice to the Brevard
County Sheriff's Office. I think it needs to go to all the agencies in the county. Melbourne Police
Department, Florida Highway Patrol was involved when the vehicle went into the ditch. They were on scene.
There's a video that's got numerous Florida Highway
Patrol vehicles depicted in the video. Obviously West
Melbourne Police Department, Palm Bay Police Department,
Titusville Police Department, all the police agencies
within the county.

And then at least let the courtroom deputies be RYAN REPORTING

vigilant during the trial. And if one of us misses that, at least the courtroom deputies notify the Court.

I know we're going to try our best to keep eyes on everyone, but our focus is always on the witness on the stand. And it's going to take away from our focus on the witness and testimony that's coming out, and having to turn our backs every time the doors open and make sure that law enforcement personnel is not coming in to sit down and watch.

So, I think we can try to alleviate the problem both by the Court's suggestion and hopefully the courtroom deputies kind of keeping an eye on it and letting the Court know. Or maybe even directing the personnel to say, well, if you're not a witness, we may not be able to have you in here dressed in that uniform because of the concerns that we have for the jury.

THE COURT: I think what I can do is this. I will issue as part of this Order, a policy that off-duty police officers who are not witnesses and who are not -- actually, because off-duty police officers --

MR. McMASTER: Can be witnesses.

THE COURT: -- excluding witnesses --

MR. MOORE: And security.

THE COURT: -- and security personnel in the courtroom, are directed not to wear their uniforms if RYAN REPORTING

they want to observe this trial.

MR. MOORE: Or any law enforcement regalia; that could include T-shirts --

THE COURT: Or anything with law enforcement insignia on it.

MR. PIRROLO: Right. I would say insignia. I know every police department has a polo shirt that's got the insignia.

THE COURT: That would have the insignia on it. I would think anything, hat.

Now, having said that, I'll direct Mr. McMaster to inform the law enforcement agencies in Brevard County of this policy.

MR. McMASTER: Judge, you get me the Order about what you require and I'll be happy to communicate that to the law enforcement agencies. I'm not going to tell them what they can and can't wear.

THE COURT: Well, if you want to know the truth, I'm not sure I can tell them that either. So, I will -that's why I'm making it a policy, and I will direct my deputies to observe that. They'll ask if they're witnesses. If they say no, they can say to them, that it's a policy of Judge Reinman during these proceedings that if you are here to observe, that you not wear your uniform.

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Now, from there, if they insist on wearing the uniform, we'll have to have -- and they may have a constitutional right to wear their uniform in here, I'm not sure -- but we'll have to readdress that if that becomes an issue.

2.4

I think if one or two decide that they're going to do that anyway, I'm not sure that would be an issue. But if ten or 20 or 30 decided they were going to do that, we'll have to readdress it.

But at this time, that's how I'll handle that.

I'll do some other research on this issue and see if

there's -- if I know of any other way it's been handled

in other courtrooms with regard to that.

But I'll issue a policy for purposes of this trial.

Not a general policy, but for purposes of this trial.

And I will direct my court deputies to, if they get in and they're sitting in, to make that request, that it is the policy of this courtroom not to wear their law enforcement uniform or anything that identifies them as law enforcement.

Okay. It looks like we've addressed everything that's pending at this time; is that correct?

MR. McMASTER: I believe so.

MR. MOORE: Yes.

THE COURT: We have the other hearing set for RYAN REPORTING

February the 20th at 3:00 p.m. I will do a pretrial at that time. If you want additional -- I'm requesting if you want additional motions to be heard, if you'll notice them for that date, do a Notice of Hearing, and send a copy to Ms. Billie.

What I'm fearful of is that things are getting filed and I'm not sure they're getting filed to because I'm not necessarily seeing a copy, or a copy's not necessarily getting sent to me. So, if you do a Notice of Hearing and send that to me, I'll know to pull up the motion and review the motion.

Okay. And I'll ask both sides to do that.

MR. McMASTER: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else we need to address for today?

MR. McMASTER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Court is adjourned. Thank you. Court is adjourned until 9:00 o'clock tomorrow for calendar call.

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(The digital proceedings were concluded at 5:26 p.m.)

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## CERTIFICATE

STATE OF FLORIDA )
COUNTY OF BREVARD)

I, Sheryl J. Dixon, Transcriptionist and Notary Public, do hereby certify that I was authorized to and did transcribe the foregoing proceedings via a digital recording; that the transcript is a true and correct transcription to the best of my ability.

I further certify that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.

DATED this 24th day of June, 2014.

Sheryl J. Dixon Transcriptionist Notary Public - State of Florida My Commission Number EE864441 Expires May 5, 2017

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